ON THE ROLE OF FORGIVENESS IN CRIMINAL
SENTENCING
RichardLowell Nygaardl

I.

INTRODUCTION

A man guilty of many sins repented bitterly and returnedto the right
path. But in time, his desirefor the things of the world returned stronger
than ever, and he again surrendered himself to evil thoughts and acts.
Then sorrow wrung his heart and reduced him to a miserable state.
Again he wished to change his attitude, but had not the strength to do so.
Day and night, as a grain of wheat in a hot pan, his heart could not keep
still, and his tears watered the dust. One morning, a mysterious voice
spoke to him: Listen to the Lord of the World. When you repented the
first time I acceptedyour penitence. Though I could have punished you I
did not do so. A second time when you fell into sin I gave you a respite,
and now even in my anger I have not caused you to die. And today, 0
fool, you acknowledge your perfidy and wish to return to me a third time.
Return, then, to the Way. I open my door to you and wait. When you
have truly changedyour attitude your sins will be forgiven.
Attar's, THE CONFERENCE OF THE BIRDS2
"Anecdote of a Criminal"
The offender's criminal history is a fundamental consideration in
American sentencing proceedings. We put much stock in how one has
behaved in the past to assist us in predicting how that person will behave
in the future. All legislatively guided or mandated sentencing plans and
statutes permit, and some require, a judge to enhance an offender's sentence if he3 has committed other crimes. If one's past misbehavior is
extensive, many plans allow a judge to declare the offender to be incorI Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; J.D., University of
Michigan Law School; B.S., University of Southern California. Judge Nygaard's published works include essays on topics ranging from legal history to legal philosophy.
2 Quoted in Jacob Needleman, Real Philosophy 112 (1990).
3 When referring to offenders, I use the masculine form throughout because, in reality, 90% of those convicted of violating our criminal laws are males.
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rigible and a career criminal, and to impose severe penalties, even life
imprisonment. This consideration is not without some justification; indeed, the practice has considerable support.
We all learn from past experiences, which if sufficiently unpleasant
or painful, give most of us pause to consider whether we should ever
again do that which caused us the discomfort or pain. This, I call the
"hot stove" principle: touch + burn + instant pain = lesson; "I won't
do that again." The American penal credo is based upon this theory.
Hence, penal theory goes, if one has not learned from past punishment,
the punishment for the new offense must be intensified; which, in present
terms, means by increasing the penal duration, because the instrument of
punishment itself-imprisonment-remains the same. Penology does not
forget. The offender forever remains guilty of his crime. His past is always there, usually haunting him. I question both whether courts should
be entitled or required to impose a sentence more severe than is indicated
by the offender's contemporaneous nature and his future potential, and
whether allowing one's entire criminal offense history to dominate sentencing decisions is uniformly, penologically productive.
Having said that, however, nothing I herein advocate should be misconstrued as an apology for those who fail to behave and/or who disobey
the law. Freedom is another form and degree of bondage. To remain
free from a chaotic political will, we cede certain of our freedoms to and
for the good of the public order. We are willing to lose some control so
that we thereby may retain the rest of it. Hence, obedience to rules is essential to an orderly society. Nor do I suggest any shifting basis for
morals. Kant was correct, the moral imperative is categorical. 4 One
cannot get to it. One starts from it. The process of condemning the
moral quality of an act and proscribing it by law is enabled by and flows
from existing moral principles. Laws are not formed from a tabula rasa;
or, says C.S. Lewis, that is where they end up. 5 And, like Kant, Lewis
and a host of others believe that obedience to ethical rules and moral
principles, whether embodied in laws or not, is a fundamental duty. Although there is no excuse for crime; there is always, however, a reason.
What I argue for are steps within the criminal justice delivery system for
discerning why the offender-every offender- committed the crime; for
designing a more productive penal response to assure that people comply
with our laws; and when they do not, for discerning practical remedies

4 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDwORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 70 (H.J. Pa-

ton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964).

5 See C.S. Lewis, On Ethics, in CHRIsTiAN REFLECTIoNs 53 (Walter Hooper
ed.,
1967).
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that produce positive results, and whose results have predictable value.
Nothing of the sort is currently happenig. 6
It is not politically correct to consider anything for criminals other
than tougher punishment and longer imprisonment. Moreover, there is
some risk in proposing novel, probably misunderstood and certainly unpopular reforms to this notion. Nonetheless, in earlier essays I have argued that American penology is fundamentally flawed; that punishment as
a sole response to crime is largely a failure and we must do more; and,
that it makes no sense not to require change from anyone who is ever to
be released from prison. Almost anyone can meet and master their fear
of punishment, or even of death-but to change is tough.7
I have attacked as specious the reasoning by which we purport to
support offense-based punishment and have argued instead for a criminal
justice delivery system that concentrates upon the offender's shortcomings in formulating an appropriate, remedial sentence. 8 I have challenged
the concept of prison as a sufficient remedy for criminal offenders. I
have reviewed the fallacies-philosophical, psychological, and penological-contained in our penal policy on the death penalty; stating my belief
that the death option is penologically sound only as extermination." I
have looked with some hope into the future, to behavioral genetics and
what its discoveries may mean to the future of remedial penology." I
have also rejected as nonsense the binary, sane/insane option we give our
jurors who must decide who we will treat with compassion and who we
will punish with vengeance.'

6 As I write this, violent crimes and reported crimes generally are down.
We can
take no comfort, however, in this statistic or this change unless we know why and alter

our response to crime accordingly. The change may be unrelated to the criminal justice
delivery system's efforts. And, to claim success without knowing what caused the success, is no more scientific than betting on a "hot streak" at the roulette wheel.

Moreo-

ver, the crime rate is still too high, and the consequences too expensive in both human
and economic terms.
7 See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Myth of Punishment: Is American
Penology
Readyfor the 21st Century?, 5 REGENT U.L. REv. 1-12 (1995).
See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Philosophy of Sentencing: Or, Why Punish?,
5 WiDEN

1. PuBuc LAW 237-68 (1996).

9 See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Is Prison an Appropriate Response to Crime? 40
ST.
Louis U. L. 677 (1996).
10 See Richard Lowell Nygaard, On Death As Punishment, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv.
825
(1996).

See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Freewill, Determinism, Penology and the
Hwnan
Genome: Where's a New Leibniz When w Really Need Him?, The University of Chicago

Law School Roundtable, 3, No. 2, 420 (1996).

12 See Richard Lowell Nygaard, The Insanity of Mental Defenses and the Law, 49

VILL. L. REv., 955 (1996).
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In this essay, I will hypothesize that in certain instances it would be
beneficial to society if, after we have asserted the authority and superiority of the community's cultural position relative to the offenders' by
punishing them, we were to permit certain of them who are sincerely
sorry 13 to repent, atone for their crimes, and to seek with the potential
for earning, an official forgiveness-a "fresh start."
This hypothesis
also has historical support.
Many jurisdictions have time limits that bar the sentencing judge's
use of prior criminal convictions after a specified period of time. This
bit of forgiveness is presumably born of respect for the old saw that
"time heals all wounds," and of the hope that the metaphor includes the
possibility that time also heals one's propensity to commit crimes. 1 5 Ju13 Kant would describe this status as when one has sufficient conscience to pass moral
judgment upon his own actions and be guided by what is ethically proper; not merely
what is legal. See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETncs 129 (Louis Infield trans.,
1930). One whose behavior is guided only by laws is safe from condemnation until

caught. One who is guided by a moral code, however, suffers self-condemnation for infractions; hence, he fears the vice, not the consequences.
Shakespeare's classic view of one's self-condemnation and conscience is expressed

in King Richard Iff, Act V, Scene 3:
0 coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me! What? Do I fear myself?
There's none else by. Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I. Is there a

murderer here? No. Yes, I am. Then fly. What, from myself? Great
reason why, lest I revenge. What, myself upon myself? Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good that I myself have done unto myself? 0,
no! Alas, I rather hate myself...
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, ... crying all, Guilty! Guilty!
14 My use of the term "fresh start" comes, of course, from the opportunity offered in
the United States Bankruptcy Code, which allows a trustee to administer certain nonexempt assets of the debtor's to pay as many debts as possible and discharges all debts of
the debtor in bankruptcy. Hence, the debtor gets a fresh, debt-free start.
15 Empirically, we know this to be valid because arrests after persons have reached
their mid-thirties drop dramatically. Presumably, this is because most people tend not to
commit crimes after they sufficiently mature; studies confirm this fact. Almost all antisocial personality disorders of problem behavior males are in "remission" by age 45.
See Irving Gottesman & H. Goldsmith, Developmental Psychotherapy of Antisocial Behavior: Inserting Genes Into its Ontogenesis and Epigenesis, in THREATS TO OPTIMAL
DEVELOPMENT, INTEoRATNwo BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL RISK FACTORS 72
(1994).
The Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview Score ranks subjects in five successively-more complex categories and stages of moral reasoning. These categories are: (a)
preconventional reasoning; which includes Stage 1, obedience and punishment orientation
and Stage 2, instrumental purpose and exchange; (b)conventional reasoning, which includes Stage 3, interpersonal accord and conformity and, Stage 4, social accord and system maintenance; and (c) postconventional reasoning, which is Stage 5, social contract,
utility, and individual rights. Studies have found that at age 36, 89% of American males
have developed to the conventional stage of moral reasoning and only 11% to the postconventional stage. See ANTONIO R. DEMASIO, DESCARTES' ERORt: EMOTION, REASON
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 48 (1994).

984

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:980

venile offenders too, usually have an opportunity to start over when they
Statutes in
reach an age, arbitrarily determined, called "adulthood."
many jurisdictions permit juvenile offenders to seek an expungement or
redaction of their juvenile records, after a period of "clean" adult behavior. Rehabilitative diversion programs, such as those for first-time offenders of "driving while intoxicated" laws and even some first-offense
theft crimes, often permit adult offenders to seek expungement of their
records after an educative and rehabilitative probation program. Other
statutes allow one who has achieved a chronological threshold of seniority, 16 to petition the courts to have one's criminal record expunged.
Indeed, it is the rehabilitative aspects of these various sentencing
schemes that permit both the offender and society to turn their backs on
the past and allow an individual to begin anew. These are varieties of
unrecognized, yet nonetheless official forgiveness. These programs have
the essential ingredients of forgiveness except that we do not call it forgiveness, nor does the government take appropriate credit for the psychological foresight of its schemes. If we truly wish to correct our criminal
law offenders, this practice, now unrecognized and confined to a very
restricted number of offenses, should be expanded to include other offenses. Such practice should systematically permit one, irrespective of
age, but upon specified and limited criteria, and in conjunction with a
remedial sentencing scheme, to earn the same-forgiveness.
Forgiveness is to be distinguished from the acts of pardoning an offender or granting amnesty. Forgiving is not the same. A pardon is an
executive act that relieves an offender from some penalty he is enduring.
Amnesty releases one from even the accused status and actually results in
the offending act being considered acceptable. Forgiveness is at once
more and less. It is more than an act-it is an attitude. It is less, however, than a release from prosecution or penalty.
Forgiveness is also not mercy. Mercy is a maudlin, emotional act in
which one shows another better treatment than is deserved. Mercy may
be shown by anyone, however, only the wronged can forgive. Forgiving
is also not condonation, which is akin to amnesty but goes a step further
and denies the "wrongness" or turns a blind and accepting eye to the evil
of a deed. Forgiveness looks evil in the eye, condemns it, but still
permits one who meets theforgiver's criteria, to start anew.
It is also important not to confuse forgiveness with the offender's
contrition. Just as forgiveness is not forgetting and is not condonation,
neither should forgiveness flow simply from a finding that an offender is

16

Usually a superannuation. In Pennsylvania, it is the age of 70. See 18 PURDON'S

PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES ANNOTATED § 9122(b)(1).
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resigned to his punishment or has accepted responsibility for his act. Repentance, or acceptance of responsibility, does not help the victim or the
sovereign-it is a step towards, done by and for, the rehabilitation of the
offender. The offender should not be rewarded for doing what helps
only him. Forgiveness comes much later. It is consequentially the last
act after the blame, conviction, reproach, punishment, and correctional
schemes have induced a death/rebirth experience-i ps-avota' 7-in the
offender that has been determined to be genuine. When justice has been
done, a conditional forgiveness permits an end to the proceeding to avoid
what to some may become an injustice, but more importantly, to vitiate
what may stand between a worthy and corrected individual who had
"truly changed his attitude" and a productive role for him in our civilization. I 1 am attracted, at least partially, to Jeffrie Murphy's definition:
forgiveness is "forswearing resentment on moral grounds." 9 To which
definition I herein add my pragmatist's view on penal theories. So, what
is forgiveness?
II. FORGIVENESS
But if the wicked man turns away from all the sins he committed, if he
keeps all my statutes, he shall surely live, he shall not die. None of the
crimes he committed shall be remembered against him; he shall live because of the virtue he has practiced.
Ezekiel 18:21-22.
Individually, our capacity for forgiveness is determined by several
factors but distills to really one question we each must ask ourself: "Do I
want to forgive?" Most of us are capable of forgiving even the most
grievous offenses against us. But, as the experts agree, it is a matter of
personal choice. Experts also submit that forgiving one's offender is
usually always beneficial to the forgiving victim; for hate and bitterness
cause less pain to the object of the emotion-the offender-than the victim who harbors hate or bitterness. The poet Shelley said it brilliantly:

17

Usually translated as "repentance." But it actually means something richer; closer

to "whole change" or "new state" of mind, indicating a wholly new direction.
19 The forgiveness following Roman Catholic confession, for example, is likewise
conditional. One is given absolution only for personal contrition, a resolution and some
performance. One must be truly sorry for having erred. One must resolve never to do it
again. And, one must usually perform some form of penance. Although one will most
surty err again, one is, at least at this point, ready to start afresh.
JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FoRGIvENEss AND MERcY 25 (1988).
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There is no sport in hate, where all the rage is on one side. 20
Society, unitarily, is just a collection of individuals, and social rage
too is wholly unproductive. Indeed, as it is with individuals, social rage,
hatred, and revenge are equally as destructive to society.
According to Lewis B. Smedes, individual forgiving proceeds
through four stages: hurt, hate, healing, and reconciliation. The first
stage is precipitated when someone causes pain so deep and unfair that
one cannot overlook it: one has become a victim of a crime. In the second stage one is unable to shed the memory of the degree to which one
was hurt and is unable to wish the enemy (the offender) well. It is only
in the third stage that one is first able to see the offender through a new
lens as a person; another fallible human who has erred. Only with keen
insight and great effort does one then come to the fourth stage. Smedes
says:
To be able to forgive, we must have the guts to look hard at the
wrongness, the horridness, the sheer wickedness of what somebody
did to us. We cannot camouflage; we cannot excuse; we cannot ignore. We must eye the evil 2face
to face and we call it what it is.
1
Only realists can be forgivers.
Nonetheless, despite both the destructive nature of hate and revenge,
and the manifest advantages of forgiveness, many of us would rather forfeit a relationship, even with one close to us, than to undertake the
somewhat more difficult work of forgiveness and repair. Living in a
throwaway age, we have become accustomed to getting rid of that which
is no longer functioning properly. We believe it's simpler and more
convenient to replace than it is to repair. 22
In the penal sense, we believe that by simply putting people away, it
will be easier to ignore them; easier to forget them. But crime is too
prevalent for society to be indifferent to its perpetrators. And, the problem with this method of dealing with crime is that we can no longer
simply throw away, banish, be indifferent to, or ignore those who have
transgressed our laws. We know better. We may desire to place offenders among the forgotten, but we cannot forget "them."
They come
back-often to prey again. We can no longer legitimate our insensitivity
by our ignorance.
Rather than considering our transgressors as
"throwaways," we must instead be pragmatic and begin to think of re-

20 PERcY BYSSHE SHELLEY, PoEms OF BYRON, KEATS AND SHELLEY 536
(Elliot Coleman ed., 1967).
21 LEWIs B. SmEDES, FORGIVE AND FORGET: HEALING THE HURTS WE DON'T DESERVE
1412(1984).
CHAR.xs KLEIN, How TO FORGIVE WHEN YOU CAN'T FORGEr 33 (1995).
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cycling what is now23 considered our human refuse and to develop techniques for doing so.
Few of us can forget the wrong done to us and often we believe
mistakenly that forgetting is a necessary predicate to forgiveness. Hence,
we conclude that because we cannot forget, we cannot or do not wish to
forgive. Forgetting, however, is neither a predicate to forgiving, nor to
being forgiven. 24 To "forgive and forget" is not only unrealistic and unproductive; it is untrue. Indeed, the converse is true, it is necessary that
one remember: the offender must remember the wrong committed, and
the victim must remember the harm received
in order for the offender to
25
be forgiven and for the victim to forgive.
Mona Weissmark, professor of psychology at Roosevelt University,
whose parents were Dachau and Buchenwald survivors, and Ilona
Kuphal, whose father had been a Nazi S.S. Officer, organized the firstever meeting between children of Nazis and children of Holocaust survivors to explore their guilt, anger, and resentment. 26 Their intent for
bringing the two sides together Weissmark said, "was not to forget the
past but to change the future."21

23 Pragmatism, comes from xpayprucoq, meaning "real"

and

aypaTucoTrrl,

meaning "reality." The pragmatic "reality" in which I am penologically interested is the
result of it all- social safety. As a pragmatist, I recognize that some offenders are paradigmatically recidivistic. For example, the pathologically criminal, the violent, those who
commit rape and other crimes of sexual, and "targeted" violence, i.e., violence motivated
by racially, ethnically, or sexually-based hatred. We know too little about and we have
studied far too superficially why persons commit crimes. There are undoubtedly many
other indicia, that could lead us to more accurately conclude which offenders are greatly
at risk for continued criminal activity. For these offenders, we may well have to conclude, at least until we can find remedies, that it is unlikely that anything will work.
There are other offenders who, for various reasons, are rehabilitated and do not return to
the system. We know this because simple statistics verify it. We should discover why
we happened to succeed with the rehabilitated offenders and begin to expand upon and
employ the techniques that work on other repentant offenders deemed salvageable. See
generally Nygaard, supra note 7.
24 Recall that Dante, by drinking out of the first river, received forgiveness. When
he
left purgatory he had to drink out of the second river to forget. Forgiveness is no different in the offering. For one cannot forgive another for an act since forgotten. See
DANTE, THE DIvINE COMEDY OF DANTE AIGHiEm 101-04 (Eliot Norton trans., Great
Books of the W. World 1952).
25 Dr. Janet Malone says that "our challenge is to forgive and remember."
Janet
Malone, Forgive But Don't Forget, in HuMAN DEVELOPMENT 5 (1994) (emphasis added).
26 See Mona Weissmark et al., Physchosocial Themes in the Lives
of Children of
Survivors and Nazis, in JOURNAL OF NARRATIVE AND LIFE HISTORY 319-35 (1983). See
generally DANIEL BAR-ON, LEGACY OF SILENCE: ENCOUNTERS wmTH CHILDREN OF THE
THIRD RmCH (1989).
27 Kin S. Hirsh, Daughter of Holocaust Survivors Finds Commonality with
Children
of Oppressors, CHImco TRn., Apr. 30, 1995.
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In penology it is likewise neither necessary nor advantageous that
we forget an offender's past. Here too, we must never forget that we
should, if possible, be about the work of behavioral repair and view each
sentence for its potential as a remedy for future improvement, not just a
retribution for past failures. We must change our concept of punishment:
It must be a tool to implement the offender's need for change; and, not a

weapon to execute the public's desire for revenge. The real problem is
not how to punish offenders, but how we can afterwards rehabilitate them
into the community. I submit that just as forgiveness succeeds with personal relationships, if forgiveness is granted where appropriate in an institutional setting, so will forgiveness aid cultural relationships, by facilitating the correction-the recycling if you will -of the offender.
Hatred forms an emotional bond between the subject-the victim

and society, and the object-the offender. Our attitude towards offenders
thus creates a psychological dilemma: We are terrified of any feelings of
intimacy or identification with offenders. Nonetheless, and paradoxically, we refuse to release offenders from the emotional bond created by
hatred. To paraphrase Smedes, we must be able to detach ourselves from

the wrongs committed against us to enable us to see our offenders, personal or criminal, as persons needing correction. Hence, on a social
level, if we fail to detach from the past, break this emotional bond, and
look objectively at offenders, we allow the accumulated resentments of
the past to determine our present policies, drag their past into the present, and impress it into our future. As a result, our culture thus enslaves
itself to its own painful past. And, by fastening itself to the past, culture
lets its hate become its future. 28
Did not government, to stem escalating personal retributions, take
from us the right to respond personally to a criminal offense perpetrated
on us? Is it not a primary theory and goal of criminal law to declare
certain very personal, but antisocial acts to be crimes against the political
corpus and the public peace and, thus, foreclose a destructive cycle of
"self-help" or personal vendettas and potentially endless recriminations?
The answers are clearly "yes." Although the crime might violate a victim in a very personal and traumatic way, by virtue of the fact that we
have ceded some of our rights to the government to empower it to make
laws governing conduct, we have also ceded our option of personally selecting the remedy we as victims may wish to have employed upon the
offender. The crime is against the sovereign or the general peace, and
government is exclusively empowered to provide an institutional response. Criminology historically begins by regulating vengeance and
28 See SMEDES, supra note 21, at 132-33.
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matures to the stage where it substitutes public justice for private vengeance. As a concomitant of the power given government, however, I suggest that it must also take responsibility and account for its failure to respond properly. The criminal law gives a jurisprudential imprimatur to
its citizens' resentment and anger. To the extent, however, that law
simply follows the passions of the people, rather than to lead, to challenge or to educate them toward more productive responses, I posit that it
errs. For government at that point has abdicated its responsibility to defend and to improve the moral fiber of the polity. It is simply carrying
out the private desire for revenge. It must do more.
Penology remembers-of course it must. Nonetheless, just as forgiveness aids the healing process in individuals, a cultural forgiveness
expressed in our penology may aid the cultural healing process as well.
For penology to be fully pragmatic and legitimate, it must not simply be
preoccupied with calling offenders to account for acts already committed-which I fully endorse-but, in addition, the entire process must
concern itself with preventing future disorder in, and pain to, society.
My "hot stove" analogy is incomplete because the stove acts without
rancor and burns impersonally as a simple consequence to all who touch
hot stoves. Moreover, the contact (or punitive aspect) lasts no longer
than is necessary to teach a lesson to the toucher. No one campaigns on
a slogan of "hotter stoves" or "longer contact." When it comes to our
response to criminal misbehavior, however, the equation is loaded with
value concepts of good and evil. Thus, morally armed and righteously
indignant, humans desire revenge. Politicians all too often eschew the
role of statesmen and routinely pander to that base desire, although they
either know the results of revenge to be unproductive or ignorantly convince themselves that, even though unproductive elsewhere in relationships, excessive retaliation will somehow work with crime. It never has;
it still does not. I submit that the highest obligation of governmental
leaders is to guide the social struggle so as to achieve the most stable and
balanced equilibrium of social forces. Excessive retaliation invites reprisal.
We should explore a gentler way of punishment, at least for some
offenders. We need not hate offenders to abhor crimes. I suggest that
systemically we become kinder and more practical. Although I am sure I
was punished in my youth for various infractions and by diverse persons,
I do not remember any specific instance. I do, however, remember with
the clarity of a current event, a time when I deserved revenge and received compassion; when I deserved punishment and received forgiveness. I have never forgotten that lesson in grace, although I was then but
a preteen. Society may need a cathartic outlet to express its contempt for
those who commit outrageous acts against fellow citizens. Nonetheless,
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as we express our anger, we reveal much about ourselves. The dark desire for revenge we express in our penology displays a certain ill grace,
which a measure of forgiveness for offenders who have truly changed,
may serve to brighten.'
But first, who are the offenders: Who are
"they" of whom I write?

III. THE MYTH OF THE CRIMINAL CLASS
"Forbearto judge,for we are sinners all."
Shakespeare
It is so easy to hate. Whites, Blacks, Jews, Christians, Catholics,
Protestants, communists, the rich, the poor, gays-someone hates
"them." Maybe you; maybe me. Each of us in our unguarded moments
finds someone we can hate-if we are willing to surrender our consciences a little; if we want to be unkind; and, if we decide to. I recall
the fearsome way our nation's enemies were portrayed in my youth. The
Japanese soldier with squinty eyes and rounded glasses displaying a hateful, hideous, toothy leer, brandishing a bayoneted rifle, and the squarejawed, cruel-looking, jack-booted German Nazi soldier with his helmet
pulled down nearly covering his eyes, who glowered menacingly at us
from War Bond posters on the Post Office wall. I feared "them." And
my fear, as fear usually does, came out in hatred.
"They" were the Japs and the Krauts whom we routinely shot and
killed in the neighborhood war games we played. Even though I was
taught from my earliest years to "love thine enemies," these people were
different. No one was condemning me for hating these enemies. I hated
not just those who bombed Pearl Harbor, and not just the demonic minds
who conceived the monstrous evils inflicted upon the war's victims; not
just those who committed other horrid atrocities, and whose names have
become charactonyms for indescribable evil; or those who turned a blind
29 In sentencing, we call our motivations many things: deterrence, containment,
rehabilitation, and retribution. These are just words. A skilled communicator, however,
listens with great care. When we listen to what is talking, the subtextual rationalization, it
gets ugly. For it is usually hatred, "getting even," and giving to offenders "what's coming to them," that motivates personal and individual attitudes towards offenders. "Just
desserts" is often a euphemism some misuse to mask revenge.
Few people talk pragmatically when discussing crime. For example, of those who
favored the death penalty, the primary reason given to justify their attitude was vengeance. See LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH 101 (1994). People want to get even; and,
to date, our governmental leaders have done little to raise the intellectual level of this
dialogue. Francis Bacon said that "in taking revenge, a man is but even with his enemy." SIR FRANCIS BACON, THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS OF FRANCIS BACON 15 (E.P.
Dutton 1900). Even odds are not good enough. We control the "house." We should set
the odds to come out ahead.
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eye while
others did their heinous deeds: I hated all "Japs," all
"30
"Krauts.
Soon after the war, we were given a new object of official hatredthe communists-which included the citizens of central and east Europe,
China, and anyone who sided with "them." We hated "them." It felt
good to hate "them." Culturally, hating "them" was acceptable; they
were the "commies" 'and the "reds." After all, just as with our World
War II enemies, it was patriotic to hate our cold war enemies as well.
Indeed, we were unified against and bound together by our common hatred of "them."
I later learned that another common and unifying theme of our culture is that all of us can fear and hate criminals. They too are pariahs.
This hatred, even when it reaches the pitch of paranoia, is socially acceptable. The paranoia we feel about "criminals" is not an individual
pathology-it is societal. It is considered a normal and even an admirable quality of a culture to loath its deviants. Culture is the common ethos
that binds us and, by definition, comprises the evolved norms and rules
we have established for ourselves and each other. Hence, so it follows,
one who violates this credo is to be treated with skepticism, reproach,
fear, and that which follows, a hatred towards them for betraying us by
violating the tenets of our cultural faith. By violating the rules, the offender threatens what we accept as good: He has, after all, done something that we, by being a part of the culture, agreed not to do. This hatred has developed a life of its own and an economy to sustain it.
Our ingrained or innate sense of fairness does not allow us comfortably to accommodate those who fail to consider others sufficiently, or
worse, who take advantage of them. In penology, however, we have
taken this to an extreme. Around a "love good/hate evil" dichotomy, we
have built treasured myths of punishment designed to stabilize our uncertainty and sustain us. To love good and hate evil, however, is all too often transformed into loving ourselves and hating outsiders. The criminal
offenders are the ultimate in outsiders, and in the barren abstract are
quite safe to hate. 3 ' But, are they and should we? People wonder how a

30 Even the United States Supreme Court fell prey to this brand of reasoning.

See

Korimatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944), wherein the Court upheld a con-

viction for violating an order requiring all Americans of Japanese descent to report to internment camps.
31 Hatred in this abstract sense is a bit more complicated emotion. Hatred, in reality,
is a personal emotion directed towards a known subject. When we do not personally
know the subject, what we usually feel is a resentment towards some act or acts the subject has performed that contravene laws, customs, or other relationships. Like the "love"
a teen claims for a movie or music idol, really, it is the public image or illusion formed in
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culture that produced a Bach, a Mendelssohn, a Beethoven, and a Mozart, and thus bequeathed to the world such beauty, could also produce a
Hitler, an Eichmann and a Mengele, thereby leaving the world such a bequest of evil. How could a land of such natural alpine splendor and grand
architectural beauty allow itself to develop such unspeakable ugliness as
death camps? How could a culture that produced such great thinkers as
Kepler, Einstein, Schiller, Nietzsche and Kant allow the development of
science and politics as mindless and bereft of shame, compassion, and
morality as Naziism? It is because in all cultures, and in all peoples there
exist the seeds of beauty, compassion, and the capacity for life. And,
likewise in all cultures and peoples there exist the germs of evil, hatred
and the capacity for death. While wondering, we ask ourselves how a
culture such as ours that is producing unparalleled comfort and wealth;
leads the world in scientific discoveries; has the best medical facilities;
and the finest universities could satisfy itself with a penology that thrives
on retribution and punishment with little consideration for finding the
causes of and cures for crime? The answers might scare us.
First, we have no universal, eternal, and philosophical criterion of
truth and justice by which we can engage in any profound analysis and
objectively critique historical acts of inhumanity. "Justice" imposed by
legislatures without any theory of nomos, or law of life, 32 and without
empirical data upon which to support their choices of law, is doomed to
wander like Odysseus from temptation to catastrophe, but unlike Odysseus, to do so without a principle or ideal by which to interpret and respond to the current events. Creating laws, to be followed or enforced in
the Hobbesian sense, based upon polls or popular reasoning, is not leadership. Polls may only reflect the public's ignorance, or measure its confusion. All this means popular notions are an infirm basis upon which to
build an orderly society, because socially we tend to identify ourselves
with one another and to the extent we receive the approval of others, it
becomes our own judgment of our actions. If we are just following the
other, we are then like cultural dogs chasing our own tails. Without a
guiding force justice is always just experimental. This is judicial anomie.
To follow this moral ebb and flow leads to chaos, not order. And we are
then merely judging our actions and the actions of others in terms of the
total, cumulative perceptions of a current cultural situation.
In law, if justice only follows the trend of public opinion, it has no
word worth listening to or following-it only has current enthusiasm and
emotions at best, but neither certainty nor a reality that can hold its
the mind of the beholder towards which the emotion is directed; an image that may have
little basis in reality when the person becomes known.
32 See PAUL TILuCH, THE PROTESTANT ERA 56 (1957).
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ground. Hence, law would then be only what would be done anyhow,
without regard to whether it guides human nature toward an ideal. Justice is not the process of civilization. It must be its ideal. And law must
be more than the human consummation of popular action: It must be the
ideal that transcends, judges, and transforms it. Both law and justice
must have some absolute point of reference, because justice is surrendered by adapting it to its environment. It must be built upon carefully
developed historical roots and scientific facts, rather than immediate
hysteria.
Second, what we have become culturally or individually depends
upon the side of human nature that we cultivate, or antithetically, that we
exploit. I suggest that we use humanity as the absolute point of reference
by which we critique law, justice, and its system of delivery. I further
suggest that all official actions and reactions to crime employ the most
humanitarian means and instrumentalities available to achieve penology's
desired ends. Without a humanitarian or other immutable point of reference, then whether we are dealing with rights violations, killings, or
mass murder-they are all just matters of degree. No culture is immune
from evil if it fails to nurture hope, the love of wisdom and compassion if
it resigns itself to the inevitability of inhumanity; or if it underestimates
the cunning minds of those who plan evil, and if it emphasizes or allows
its leaders to exploit despair, hatred, and revenge at the expense of humanity.
Anger, hatred, and revenge are products of primal reason; hence,
humans at a basic level understand and identify with retaliation and punishment as rational forms of reproof. American penology is also simple.
It is based upon a central and solitary myth-the efficacy of punishment
and the practice of imposing it upon almost all offenders. All these-the
penology, the myth, the practice-are failing our culture, of that there is
little doubt. But they are retained because we remain ignorant of the
etiology, the embryology and, what I call the full ecology of crimes and
offenders; moreover, both the myth and culture's collective ignorance is
stable, understandable, and useful. The failed practices are perpetuated
because the conceptual myth of the criminal class is useful to politicians
who thrive on simple, short-term answers to complex, multi-generational
problems.
This is "contents" politics. The myth of punishment is binary and
amenable to simple communication-good versus evil. These myths are
the stuff of "sound bytes," and help the politicians who have learned that
they earn more votes by divisive rhetoric than calm leadership, avoid
taking a position on the hard questions of what practices and procedures
might really work on criminal offenders. Such a position might, in the
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macho world of politics, be disconcertingly close to the political quicksand of being considered "soft" on crime.3 3 The myth of a definable
criminal class gives all who wish to avoid the harder questions of just
what is productive a common and popular object of hatred by which to
elude the complex questions about human behavior. Unfortunately, being
"smart on crime" simply is not politically stylish. Currently, one who
asks hard questions and challenges established positions is unwelcome.
Moreover, the one most feared is the iconoclast who shatters revered
myths and legends, takes away comfortable answers, and leaves only
nagging questions in their places.
Then too, paranoia, that which follows, and a generalized hatred of
social deviants does have a psychologically useful, albeit selfish function.
We can use it to diminish our own guilt and inadequacies by transferring
onto others who are demonstrably our cultural inferiors all the negative
characteristics we do not wish to recognize in ourselves. By labeling all
criminals evil, we sufficiently dehumanize them,34 and they become ready
scapegoats for our own unacknowledged and unadmitted evil. Hence,
although this collective group of "others" suffers an extra reprobation,
the generalized attitude is: "Who cares?" For by treating "them" so, we
set ourselves apart by assuming a general superiority, separate ourselves
onto a higher plane and even function better because we thereby absolve
ourselves of the troubling guilt we might otherwise feel.
The
"innocence" and "dignity" we intend thereby to create in ourselves and
in our culture, however, is illusory because the self-absolution and elevation is artificial.
Recall with me the great story from Genesis of "the Fall," in which
Adam, who, when confronted by God for violating the one rule of the
Garden of Eden, shifts the blame to Eve, who in turn blames the serpent. 35 Today we have no mythical serpents to serve as surrogates for
the lowest of animal forms on earth and upon which to blame our shortcomings; hence, we create them. "They," "them," "the criminals" are
perfect exemplars of the evils in our society and make wonderful colu-

33 It is not possible to disassociate an unfair, unproductive and destructive criminal
justice delivery system from the personal moral responsibilities of the persons who, and
institutions that, create and perpetuate it. In truth, judges, who are usually the "whipping
boys" of the demagogues who blame crime upon "soft" judges, no longer have the discretion necessary to impose more productive sentences. Legislatures, for the most part,
now virtually control the sentences imposed upon offenders by guidelines and mandatory
sentencing schemes. Hence, they must bear their full measure of blame for systemic failures.
34 See SAM KEEN, FACES OF THE ENEMY: REFLECTION OF THE HoSTLE IMAGINATION

70 (1986).
See Genesis 3:12-13.
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brine scapegoats. Ernest Becker says we create evil in others to overcome our own insignificance. 36 Beyond creating evil, we should also
emphasize, publicize, and remonstrate against the evil others actually do
for the same reason. Because by driving others down, in relative terms,
we rise.3 7 In the language of the old aphoristic critique of criticism, "we
compound for sins we are inclined to, by damning those we have no
mind to." Indeed, if we were in unguarded moments to admit it, we
damn a few sins we "have a mind to," just to distance ourselves from
them and to keep ourselves from committing them; or at least to keep
from associating with people who do. In feeding this social deficiency,
however, we sacrifice elsewhere, for by manipulating the symptoms, we
fail to treat the source of the difficulty.
Unquestionably, there are a significant number among "them," the
offenders who, at least at current levels of understanding and corrections,
operate in a moral vacuum, are without ethical allegiance, show no motive for adopting any, and must be considered dangerous, pathological,
and incorrigible. There are also offenders who have committed such unspeakable atrocities, acts of war, and terrorist cowardice, 3 that regard36 See SAM KEEN, VOICES AND VISIONS
181 (1970).

37 Although we may be loath to admit, it may be that some cultures have
a pathological need for criminals, and that some laws are enacted to create them. Emile Durkheim
suggested that crime
may actually perform a needed service to society by drawing people together in a common posture of anger and indignation. The deviant individual violates rules of conduct which the rest of the community holds in
high respect; and when these people come together to express their outrage
over the offense and to bear witness against the offender, they develop a
tighter bond of solidarity than existed earlier.
JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GEr RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34 (1990). Hider used this psychology perversely and with devastating consequences against the Jews, Slavs, gypsies, and others, by propaganda designed
to dehumanize them; and, then by ascribing crimes to them, declared them outcasts and
outlaws, open to punishment by anyone. The Nazi indoctrination described the victims as
untermenschen, less than human. See BAR-ON, supra note 26, at 8 (citing RAUL
HIL.ERO, THE DEsTRuCION OF THE EUROPEAN JEws (1961)). Thus, Hider's policy created a centripetal force among the Germanic Nazi Aryans who as a consequence felt entided to call themselves a "master race."
38 Most crimes are motivated by greed or passion. Terrorism is different. Terrorism
is more like an act of war; that is to say, not person versus person, but state versus state
or cause versus cause. In terrorism, like war, acts of violence are performed by stealth
upon exemplars of a targeted group, irrespective of whether the targeted are innocent
persons, and perpetrated by persons who thereby intend to make a statement of usually
political origin. The act is a crime, but the crime is incidental to the hateful message they
intend to deliver thereby. Terrorism, other acts of war, and treason are exceptions to any
discussion of penalties for the reason that they evolve from different motivators and present different philosophical considerations from issues typically found in criminology and
penology. Among other reasons, this is also because terrorists and other war criminals
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less of how contrite they later become, neither their guilt nor their acts
can be diminished by light treatment. The public would wretch at the
injustice and imbalance, and any concept of justice would suffer. These
are also examples of pathological behavior, which is not even subject to
scrutiny by the usual moral criteria. These criminals are different. They
are also the criminals we feel so good about hating.
These political, social and penological failures aside, however, the
trouble with thinking of all criminal law offenders as "criminals" is that
there really is no such well-defined, all-encompassing category when you
get to know some of "them." Criminals are not just the murderers, rapists, thugs, and drug dealers we love to hate. Nor are all crimes committed by those who live in the slums-places most people have heard of,
but have never seen. Many crimes are conceived, not "out there"
somewhere, but in well-lit, clean, carpeted, and air conditioned offices by
quiet people with trimmed nails, cut hair, who wear suits, ties, and
shined shoes who live in neighborhoods like yours and mine. Criminals
are not a clear-cut and insular group of persons with whom we can condemn with collective judgments, then ostracize and hate.
Hating, blaming, and rejecting a group of people does ensure that
we do not have to take the risk or responsibility of looking more honestly
at the individual members of the group; nor for that matter looking honestly at ourselves and at our deeper feelings. 39 Contrarily, hatred creates
a blind spot in our personal awareness, and we fail to see that although
some offenders are violent, without compassion, and entitled to no systemic sympathy, others are not. Some are good, but have erred. Some
offenders are predators. Some are prey. All are offenders; but some are
victims as well. We err when we lump them together. To be sure, there
are cultural differences between individuals at the margin, and we who
are at or near the center. Criminals, nonetheless, are for the most part
surprisingly like you and me-human beings with wants and needs. They
love and are loved. They are someone's parents. They are someone's
children. Their bodies function like yours and mine. Genetically, we
differ little. Indeed, if we are to admit it, some of them are you and
some of them are me. Some of us are better than others at subduing Mr.

prosecuted by a victorious enemy are often treated with respect for their crimes and venerated as heroes by their separate cultures, however heinous their crimes. Because acts
of terrorism and war are motivated by different goals and are simply a different genre
from crimes generally, they necessitate a totally. different response. See Nygaard, supra
note 10 at 840.
9 See ROBIN CASARJLAN, FORGIVENESs: A BOLD CHOICE FOR A PEACEFUL
HEART 213
(1992).
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Hyde. 40 Nonetheless, we are quite content to hold "them" to standards
many of "us" do not meet. And, we subject "them" to penalties many
of "us" could not endure.
Then too, some of us simply have not gotten caught. The usual
stereotype of the criminal is the prison inmate. We come to believe that
criminals are criminals because they are in prison. That is not the whole
story. For, the moral quality of an act does not depend upon whether
one is caught doing it. How many among us can honestly say that we
have never committed an act that is, or may be, a violation of the law? If
you have, you are a criminal-albeit not a convicted criminal-for you
have performed an act that society has declared to be illegal. Nevertheless, it is more comfortable for us if we can place the focus elsewhere,
so, we target others.
Once we have focused upon the faults and highlighted the defects of
a target group we perceive them selectively, assume they will all behave
a certain way, and cognitively absorb only what is consistent with the
judgment we have already made of them. It does not work. How well I
recall that in the 1950s, when as a sailor in the U.S. Navy stationed in
Japan, I met some of the gentle people who we had earlier contemned as
"Japs," and whom I had hated. I discovered that the evil leaders and
warriors of World War II Japan were not accurate representatives of all
Japanese; that none of the people I met were political ideologues and, indeed, that many were victims of the awful war perpetrated by their leaders and warriors, just as we were. There was no longer a unitary
"them" who I could comfortably hate, they were just ordinary peoplemost of whom I liked.
Three decades later, I sat in a boardroom of the Russian White
House helping a ranking member of the Duma draft an Ombudsman proposal for a new Russian constitution. Days later I dined with leaders and
judges of the emerging democracy of Ukraine; in Kiev, a city that still
had forty American nuclear warheads aimed to destroy it, and us. I listened one-on-one to a Ukrainian judge tearfully tell me why he opposed
capital punishment while explaining how that very day he had applied the

40 It is an illiterate mistake to say of someone, "He (or she) is a regular Jekyll and
Hyde." Robert Louis Stevenson's classic tale is about all of us. It is about human nature. The message of the story is that each of us has a Mr. Hyde within; although some
of us have learned to control him better than others. Stevenson's gripping conclusion is
that we risk great danger if we feed the dark side of our natures. Because if we do,
someday we will be unable to suppress and control it-and our nether nature will take
over and ruin us in the same way as it, in the personage of Mr. Hyde, ruined Dr. Jekyll.
See ROBERT Louis STEVENSON, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, in THE WORKS OF ROBERT
Louis STEVENSON 159 (n.d.).
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law and condemned an individual to death. 4 1 He said, "I am tired of
violence. I am tired of killing. I am tired of death." I have been in his
shoes: I both agreed and identified with his feelings. And in Romania, I
listened to a citizen's fervent plea, as he clasped my hand in both of his
with the grip of a vice and said, "I do not know what democracy is. I
only know that I want it." No longer the feared and hated members of a
monolithic Soviet Union, the Russians, Ukrainians, and Romanians had
made themselves vulnerable by asking us for help. The "Evil Empire"
was gone, and in its place were people. They desperately wanted a role
in their own destiny. Just like you. Just like me. I laughed with them.
I cried with them. It was no longer "them" and "us." "We" had come
together. 42 No matter who you really wish to hate, whether on the basis
of race, gender, religion, politics, nationality, or a myriad of motives,
eventually you get to know one of "them," and you find out they are not
treating criminals as a class is
much different from "us." I believe that
43
no different and the results are the same.
We are all duly excited by the arrest, trial, and sentencing of an offender for having committed a spectacular crime. We experience a social
catharsis when the offender is punished for the act. But what does this
spectacle tell us about social lawlessness or who the truly lawless are?
Nothing, really. A generalized loss of shame for one's unkind acts and a
loss of compassion for the feelings of others, creates the emotional tensions between persons. A basic dishonesty within our culture spawns
seemingly insignificant but nonetheless costly crimes against society.
And a basic violence, nurtured by a skewed view of history and glamorized by sports, literature, the media arts," and even some of the music in
our culture, glorifies physical assaults. 45 We have only to watch a little
41 In Ukraine, at least until 1993, the condemning judge was responsible for making

sure the sentence was carried out-usually by a pistol shot in the back of the head, and
when the condemned person did not suspect it.
42 See Richard L. Nygaard, A Bill of Rights For the Twenty-First Century, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189 (1994).
To paraphrase a line from the American comedian, Jackie Mason: he pities those
who hate entire classes of people generally, because by doing so they forfeit the satisfaction of hating specific members of the class individually.
4 If you have Anthony Burgess's A Clockwork Orange, in Great Britain, or the various translations into French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Hebrew, etc., it has 21 chapters.
In America it has 20; and, so went Stanley Kubrick's film interpretation. Why? Perhaps
it is that Burgess's denouement, with Alex growing bored with violence; beginning as a
thug, and maturing away from his amoral actions just doesn't sell to American audiences.
Or, perhaps his publisher wanted to portray youth as wantonly violent, unrepentant and

immutably evil.
Recall from that chilling classic, Lord qf the Flies, where, in an isolated environment, child turns murderously upon child. See generally WiLIAm GOLDINO, LORD OF
THE FuEs (1954). Golding's theme is that the ethos of a society depends upon the moral
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television and only a few movies to realize that violence "sells." A significant number of "us" must crave violence, else such entertainment
media would flop.
The fact is that many of us bear some reSponsibility for the violence
and evil in our culture. For, if we wink at dishonesty, condone emotional, verbal or physical abuse, and practice violence, or support or even
condone those who do, we provide the fertile field in which the antisocial, who need little encouragement to do evil, find thereby a rationale
for their evil deeds. Culture is not made up simply of bad and good
guys. Culture is us; each placed by nature, events, and actions somewhere on a continuum between polar positions of irredeemably corrupt
and wholly incorruptible. We are all on that continuum-someplaceand, the line separating "them" from "us" is blurred, faint and, in some
places, it has become indistinguishable.
Culture is a union of humans banded together for the purpose of
seeking support in our various endeavors to live well. I view man not
necessarily as a social animal, but essentially a selfish one. We are solitary, but press together from biological drives, convention, and need to
compensate for inadequacies
•
•
46and deficiencies that otherwise may prevent
us from achieving our ends.
To accomplish these ends, every civil society establishes rules and duties of which one must take cognizance.4 7
And, to remain within the grace of the society, one must obey the rules
and perform the duties or face opprobrium, ostracism, and social deprivation. The fact of the matter is, perhaps the difficulty of the matter is,
that some of us simply do not know how to behave. Some of us know
how, but do not. Some of us know how, but cannot. 48 Some of us
simply have never learned the basic notions of civic or social duty.
Whatever the category, when caught and convicted of some act of criminal misbehavior, these are the citizens who become "them"-the criminals.
timbre and fiber of the individuals who actually compose it, and not upon the political
system that ostensibly controls it. Cultural governance ultimately evolves from and into
what we, its citizens, are and truly desire, because our leaders and our systems are a reflection of us. See id.
46 Thomas Paine said that "society is the product of our wants and government
of our
wickedness." Quoted in REwHOLD NEMUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMoRAL SocigrY 150
(1995).
Plato said that "all men who practice justice do so against their will, of necessity,
not as a good." PLATO, The Dialogues of Plato, in THE REPuBUc 31 Ia (Great Books of
the W. World 1952). We are fair with each other because it does us each a quantum of
good. See id.
48 For an excellent discussion of those who are pathologically within
this category see
generally DEMASIO, supra note 15. Nor will I here try to interpret Goethe's Faust; others
with greater minds than mine have done so. I only suggest that you read it, and draw
your own conclusions from his classic work.
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The contemporary American civilization and the global capital systern create problems that simply cannot be solved by criminal law, law
enforcement, and penology alone. Thomas Hobbes was wrong. 49 His
error, however, was not patent when all social institutions taught fundamental moral lessons and were part of an overall fabric of social pressure
upon citizens to conform to the cultural ethos. The realists were not realistic at all; at least their solutions are not for twenty-first century problems. Justice cannot be rationally dispensed by courts of law if it is not
actually assumed by the realities of life. As the social institutions that
traditionally concerned themselves with providing the nonmaterial aspects
and repairing the physicalistic aspects of correction were demeaned and
diminished in importance we were left with rules too numerous to know
of or obey. Hobbes's theory of social control by rules and punishment
for infractions thereof became increasingly less plausible as a means by
which to guide and control behavior and thereby to assure public safety.
Ostensibly, so some theorists argue, a criminal sentence is intended to

remove all advantages an offender seeks to gain from the crime;51 to inform others that the rewards of crime are not worth the consequences;
and, to correct the one who does offend. 52 Sentencing, however, is fail-

49 One question that must be faced by theorists who would prescribe forms of government is how to make people behave, for we all seek a fundamental modicum of, and
have a nostalgia for order. "Order is heaven's first law," said Alexander Pope, see Essay on Man, in COLLECTED PoEMS 207 (Bonamy Dobree ed., 1983). Hobbes was among
those who held a low estimate of humanity, and who believed that people are largely selfseeking, and only understand force. Addressing what they perceived as the reality of
human nature, the realist's answer was laws with teeth. Hobbes created an elaborate
system of punishments and rewards, with long and detailed laws. See THOMAS HOBBES,
-LEvIATHAN 145 (Great Books of the Western World, 1952).
50 Speed and certainty of apprehension were fundamental to Hobbes's theories and
indeed those of his contemporaries, which formed the guiding principles of American penology. Constitutional protections that were not contemplated by Hobbes and other theorists of his day, have limited speed and diminished certainty of both apprehension and
conviction. We are left with a system that cannot operate on Hobbes's theories alone.
Prevention and correction are the penal trump cards we have left. They are, however,
worthless until effectively played.
51 The entire notion of the "criminal balance sheet" approach fails when we think of
such crimes as rape and others that violate one in a cruel and personal way without the
predator gaining a real, nullifiable advantage. Punishment is not just to nullify evil deeds,
but also to deal with evil people who have given evidence of their evil nature by performing evil deeds.
52 William James says force is a viable means of destroying enemies, whereas charity
"turns enemies into friends" and "regenerates the object." See WILIAM JAMES, THE
VARIETiES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 358 (1982). We,
however, institutionally do not destroy, nor do we seek to destroy, our criminal enemies.
Except for a limited few, we do not even permanently banish them from public life. After
a morally contaminating experience in prison, criminals, unregenerated and still (perhaps
now) enemies of the people, are released upon society. Our options are now limited to
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Offenses vastly outnumber arrests, 5
ing in each of these categories.
and we are left with many unenforced, perhaps unenforceable, laws. The
reasons, while not obvious, become apparent when we pause to honestly
think about them.
Conviction of a crime and imprisonment may cause some to lose
their jobs. But one cannot be deterred by loss of a job if one does not, or
has no work. One is not deterred by the loss of one's family relations if
one has no family unit. One cannot be coerced by a fear that, as a result
of a criminal conviction and sentence, one's relatives will economically
suffer if they are on welfare and/or independent of the offender's efforts
anyway. Simply put, if one is not threatened by, or worse, is content
with the consequences of punishment, it does no good. The most difficult person to control by coercion is one who loses least by the sanctions
threatened or imposed. And potentially the most dangerous person in
society is the one who has nothing to lose. We have provided, by our
governmental regulations, our laws, and some public assistance programs, a medium to create some of the very uncontrollable and dangerous offenders we now seek, quite unsuccessfully, to correct by punishing
them. For all too many there is nothing more the penal system can take
away from them or can do to them to make them behave. Hence, the
negative "incentives" by which government proposes to guide much of
our culture are not all productive. Behavioral control requires more than
a post hoc reflex. The myth of punishment is being destroyed by the
reality of American life.
The axiomatic claim we make that the punishment must fit the
crime, is likewise specious. First, we really do not fit the punishment to
the crime. We give all offenders the same punishment-prison. There is
simply no good reason why this is so. It is simply a matter of political
expedience. We just imprison: all we play with in terms of "fit," is the
penal duration. There are many, well-defined classes of crimes. Criminals, while each is different, can likewise be classified. Second, as even
the least experienced parent or other lay disciplinarian knows, to be effective the punishment must fit the offender. The myth of criminals as a
separate, or at least separated, genre of human beings prevents considcontainment or correction, indicating that we consider the use of charity, at least in the
latter.
53 See generally Nygaard, supra note 8.
54 There were approximately 42.7 million crimes committed in the United States in
1994. A significant percentage were not reported to the police. And, of those reported,
only a percentage of perpetrators were arrested. About 90% of property crimes go unsolved. Of those arrested and convicted, approximately five hundred thousand convicted
offenders were sent to prison. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 217
(1995).
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eration of an appropriate remedy for the individual offender. The concept is wrong.
It is a mistake to think conceptually about "criminals" rather than
specifically about thieves, rapist, assaulters, the dishonest, or in some
cases, perhaps only the benign, but stupid or negligent. Within these
categories, we have the casual, the career, and the pathological offenders;
the corrected, correctable, and incorrigible. Yet we are now content to
merely call them all criminals, lump them all together, and treat them all

with the same remedy.

We should not. The lumps are enormous and

amorphous. Could we effectively treat the myriad of diseases by lumping
the afflicted together as the "sick" and treating all afflictions as the same
"sicknesses?" The answer is evident. Systemically, we are as unproductive in our sentences as physicians would be were they to perform the
same operation for all ailments, or to prescribe the same medicine for all
diseases, 55 and to give the same answers to all questions. Empty answers, whether in medicine or penology, only anaesthetize us-they do
not cure the afflicted nor balm the victimized. Each crime and each
criminal is different and must be dealt with as unique; each crime has a
somewhat different etiology and embryology, and each offender has a
somewhat different prognosis. By failing to treat offenders as individuals
and differently, we tend to make them all the same; and the56 bad ones,
like the proverbial bad apples, are spoiling the cultural barrel.
Psychologically we are beginning to see the extent to which crime is
but one of mankind's pathological responses to life's stimuli. Biologically, we are beginning to see the extent to which some may, by the
genes they inherited, be predispositioned towards pathological responses. 57 Historically, de Tocqueville a century-and-a-half ago pointed
55 See LoUIs BLOM-CooPE,

THE LITERATURE OF THE LAW 70 (1956); see aLso
MIcHEL FOUCAULT, DIscIPuNE AND PUNISH 117 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books

1975) ("[IfI have betrayed my country, I go to prison; if I have killed my father, I go to
prison; every imaginable offense is punished in the same uniform way. One might as
well see a physician who has the same remedy for all ills'.")(citation omitted).
See Nygaard, supra note 9, at 688:

In prison we have pooled our social weaknesses and lumped together the
good who err with the incorrigibly bad. The sad fact is that when classed
with wretched beings, many in the former category find it irresistible not to
sympathize with the latter, and the ethically weakest, and the most pathologically antisocial and uncivil elements are thus propagated, enhanced, and
perpetuated in prison. The good do not triumph in prison.

Id.

57 Genetics research and its impact in the field of behavioral genetics, however, appears on the brink of real discovery. I am not a scientist; I am a moralist. Nonetheless, I
predict that the impact of bioscience and biotechnology will create greater social and scientific turbulence in the next century than did the discoveries of Charles Darwin in the
last, and will drastically change the entire concept of health care. It will also change our
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to answers for today's questions by noting that while in "Europe a criminal... [struggles] for his life against the agents of power, while the
people are merely spectator[s] ...; in America [the criminal] is... an
enemy of the human race, and the whole of mankind is against him." 58
Today, all too-many offenders no longer need worry that mankind, or
even society, is against them. They have their own culture. This culture
then becomes "criminogenic"-it perpetuates and recreates itself.
In essence, some inner cities have become criminogenic communities, where the social forces that create predatory criminals are far more
numerous and overwhelmingly stronger than the social forces that create
virtuous citizens. At the core, the problem is that these inner city children grow up surrounded by teenagers and adults who are themselves
deviant, delinquent, or criminal. At best, these teenagers and adults misshape the characters and lives of the young in their midst. At worst, they
abuse, neglect, or criminally prey upon the young.59
Unfortunately, in the century since de Tocqueville wrote about
America, the "enem[ies] of the human race" have become too numerous
and bold to be intimidated by ostracism or opprobrium. Far from being
enemies, in some communities the offenders are the predominating social
group. We the people are indeed assuming the position of mere spectators, mistakenly relying on Hobbes's myth of rules and governmentally
imposed punishment. Peacekeeping, however, is too important to be left
solely to the governmental branch of the cultural tree. We must call
upon the allied disciplines, psychology and the physical sciences, to ask
what their observations and evidence of history can tell us about what
penal methods will be productive for tomorrow. And, we must be prepared to accept what we are told. As Albert Camus wrote,
"Unless we
6
choose to ignore reality, we must find our value in it." 0
We will discover that in reality, the sovereign in the counterculture
may be the law of the streets and not the representative government the
polity believes it can rely on for civil security. When one believes a law
or its enforcement to be unjust, one does not obey willingly. As de Tocqueville said, although the majority is unquestionably empowered to
make and enforce the law, the protestor's appeal thereof is to "the sovconcept of sentencing and punishment as the solitary response to crime if we are willing
to coordinate the discoveries in the physical, behavioral, and social sciences and see them
in the larger context as opportunities for interdiction, therapy, and prevention, rather than
as evidence to rationalize prejudice, isolation, and hatred. See generally Nygaard, supra
note 10.
58 AL
S DE ToCQuEviL
DEMOCRCY IN AmmEcA 95 (Henry Reeve trans., Alfred
A. Knopf 1945) (1948).
59 See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION Op SOcIETY 228
(1995).
60 ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL 21
(1954).
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6 1 Citiereignty of mankind" not the system he perceives to be unjust.
zenship is different in a criminal counterculture that operates within, but
nearly autonomous from our own. Indeed, for a substantial number of
persons, the mores of our culture are simply irrelevant. To them, government is not an empowering source; it is a diminishing force. The savagery of the counter-culture is as alien to ours and as discrete as if it
were a foreign country within ours. That culture is not ruled by conventional government and is unaffected by conventional laws. Its members
are unrepresented in our republic and operate under an anarchical form
whose primary goal is to avoid contact with the power elements of conventional society. Doing time is not a separation from their society, because many in the counterculture are as at home whether within the environment of prison or without. It is counterintuitive to expect one to
respect the laws of a culture in which one feels he has no opportunity to
participate.
The opportunities one has forms one's future. If the dominant culture surrounding one is criminal or countercultural, it creates the perceived bounds of opportunity, and the results among the impressionable
of that community, while not inevitable, are sadly predictable. This is
the cycle that must be broken; and punishment alone is not doing it. Few
who are thoroughly enculturated in the counterculture are controlled by
our dysfunctional myth of punishment. We must seek new methods. We
must take greater care to achieve positive results from the criminal justice
delivery system. We must be satisfied with neither the threshold concept
of justice, nor trust the palliative power of punishment alone. We must
demand more of our offenders. And, we must ask more of ourselves.
Perhaps as a society we cannot fully care if offenders of a certain
degree are injured, or even die from their anti-social efforts. 62 Even if
we do not care for the offenders, however, we must care that our culture
thrives. The notion of "us" against "them" is no longer functional.
Fear and hatred are no longer useful emotions by which to guide our penology. These emotions are at odds with both our current state of psychological awareness and that which we know to be morally proper.
They are like bacteria or viruses lying latent, but sure to break out at the
time of greatest weakness.
Our moral lens and the view we see through it are like a split image
that blurs our vision and prevents us from focusing on the real issues:
How to prevent crime and thus save citizens from becoming victims and,
how to correct offenders add interrupt the criminalization process itself.

61 See DE TocQuEvILE, supra note 58, at 303.
62 See Nygaard, supra note 10, at 825.
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It does not help our analysis to lump all offenders together-that is to say
those who get caught-and treat them the same. There are too many of
"them," and some of them are "us." We need more numerous, smaller,
well-defined lumps, because some offenders are salvageable and can become productive again. And, some should be given a fresh start.
IV. FORGIVE CRIMINALS?
Ifyou treata person as he appears to be, you make him worse than he
is. But if you treat a person as if he already were what he could potentially be, you make him what he should be.

Goethe
Perhaps in penology we too must find the middle ground in which
we can, at least for some offenders and for some offenses, let go of the
past and, for the benefit of the future look to a person's potential. Perhaps we can permit ourselves institutionally to denounce the offending act
but also to renounce hatred for, and revenge against, at least some of
those who have offended our rules. Again it distills to Smedes's real
question: Do we want to? We, of course, have no duty, no obligation to
forgive. We do, however, have an option to offer forgiveness: if we
feel that we should; if it would be productive; and, if we so choose.
Forgiveness may be a difficult penological pill for some of us to
swallow, but it is nothing new. It may be the most important part of correction. Said Tacitus, "little is gained by conquest, if followed by oppression. " 6 The same is true of conquest in the criminological sense.
We need not require, nor should we wish to see the offender grovel if we
are to foster a building relationship with him that draws upon his potential and is conducive to correction and looks to the future. Hence, we
must seek not merely conquest, but correction. Hugo said it well;
"[Nothing is so stupid as conquering, and the true glory is convincing.
We have been conquering criminals for centuries, yet crime continues unabated. We must be about the more challenging task of convincing. If we truly wish to correct the offender with the intent that he be
reconciled with society, it may not only be a helpful, but perhaps the
most responsible action, at least for some crimes and with some offenders, to forgive.

I hypothesize that human behavior and the history of moral rules
and criminal laws indicate that a universal human ethos does exist, and
63 1 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HIsToRY op ENGUSH SPEAKING PEOPLES

29 (1964).

64 1 VICTOR Huoo, LEs MisERABLS 74 (Lascelles Wraxall & Chas. E. Wilbour
eds.,

Donohue Bros. n.d.).
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that there is a common corpus of human values that constitutes the basis
of a universal ethic. We may argue about precisely what this ethic is.
For most of us, however, it will sound very much like a variation of the
"Golden Rule."65 For the primary principle guiding most basic laws is
aesthetically quite simple: To counter perceived evil in humankind requires that we think of others and forego some of our selfish interests in
favor of others and the collective good of our civilization. Tribal laws
and every code from the Hammurrabic to the contemporary reflect this
basic principle. More than law guides our behavior-something more
innate-an ideal we humans intensely desire and have consistently and
historically codified by law. 66 The law is not derived from a Hebrew, a
Christian, or an Islamic morality; their morality presupposes law. 67 The
result is that in the fabric and at the base of each civilization's humanity
is a nearly-identical list of fundamental moral injunctions that reads much
like the Mosaic decalogue, and that if we compromise, we do so at our
peril.6"
None of us determines right conduct by actually consulting with our
philosophers or advisers. Nor do we base our moral conduct entirely
upon the law. It is ethics, whether the result of the teachings of religion,
65 Huston Smith in REuGIONS OF MAN 10 (1986), calls these basic values a "water
table" of humanity. It defines that minimum threshold of civility, which historically we
have demanded of each other by our customs and laws. Smith found in each religion,
some variation of a Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."
See, e.g., Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:39 ("thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"). Or
from the Stoics and Confucius, and what Smith calls a Silver Rule, "Do not unto others
what you would not have them do unto you." SMITH, supra at 10. Philosophy is not to
the contrary. Kant said that we should act in such a way that the maxims of our actions
can become universal laws.
See generally KANT, supra note 4.
Or Hobbes's
"Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that ye do to them ....
"
HOBBES, supra note 49, at 87. And, the examples of the "rule" extend beyond my
knowledge.

66 Hume ascribes this to simple necessity; that rules are artificial boundaries on behavior, created as a predicate to an ordered culture. See DAVID HUME, Of Justice and
Injustice, in HUME'S MORAL AND PoLrITcAL PHILOSOPHY 49 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 5th ed.
1966) (1948).
As I said, the ethical imperative is categorical. See KANT, supra note 4, at 70.
r Although my conclusion certainly admits of some counter debate, the reader should
spend a rainy Saturday in the Reference section of the library, with the Encyclopedia of
Religion and Ethics before fixing a position in concrete. I believe you will, as I did, soon
begin to realize the vast commonalities in reasoning shared among the religious cultures
down through history; whether from the Babylonian Hymn to Samos, from the Laws of
Manu, the Book of the Dead, the Analects, the Stoics, or the Platonist- all contain the
same injunctions against murder, falsehood, and denounce the same fundamental wrongs
defined in our legal structure. And, all contain thresholds of morality and the same mandates of kindness to, and care for the helpless, attention to charity, honesty, and most
contain requirements similar to what we now demand of each other to be considered civilized.
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philosophy, or this common ethos, that gives us the inner strength to resist temptation to transgress the rules we have accepted by our social
contract, 69 or, in some way or other, to take more than our fair share.
Most of us, in varying degrees, respond to our common ethos and have a
basic desire to do right and to be at peace with our individual and our
collective or cultural consciences. A system that subsists on a reactionary regimen of infraction-ergo-punishment does little to nurture, foster,
instruct, or reinforce this desire. William James says that experience is
the parent of belief. 70 When we deliberately expose someone, even an
offender, to a wholly negative experience, we must expect largely negative results. And, from the growing group of ex-offenders we cannot but
expect a growing number who do not believe in our system and are content to follow their own. We must begin to build in them a belief and a
confidence in conventional society; to nurture their desire to do what is
right; and, without apology therefore, to demand that they accept and live
by our common ethos. Our fund of options, however, is limited. So,
where shall we turn?
American penology is preoccupied with what is essentially the
Christian concept of "sin. " 71 The philosophers most instrumental in developing our penology held a fundamental view that God could punish us
for sinning because we were free moral agents. Their philosophy reflected a belief that the law was sim7ply God's mortal agent, and as such,
empowered to do the same thing.
I do not believe that God's law,
whatever it may be, deputizes any among us mortals self-righteously to

6 By using the term "contract," do not assume I wholly accept Locke's theories; nor
for that matter do I wholly reject them. See generally JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL
GOVERNMENT (Great Books of the W. World, 1952). Indeed, David Hume says the same
thing. He uses the illustration of the oarsmen who, without express promises agree tacitly

that each will do his fair share. See HUME, supra note 66, at 60. "Contract" is a useful
term to describe our political relationship with each other and hence our republican theory of delegation. The existence of 'relationship" is fundamental to the functioning of
either a republican or democratic form of government; incumbent in which are all the
moral values that attend relationships.
70 See JAMES, supra note 52, at 330-31.
71 This is because Americans seem unable to escape the notion of sin. See BERTRAND
RussELL, WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN 71 (1957). Of course, that which is commonly
described as sin is often also crime. But the two are neither synonymous nor definitionally coterminous, and penology must accept the notion that although there may well be
another world for the expiation of sin-it is just the follies of Earth that offenders must
answer for in penology. As Don Quixote, seeking mercy for some wretched humans being taken to the galleys, pleads with their guards: "Let them answer for their sins in the
other world: there is a God in heaven who is not negligent in punishing the evil nor rewarding the good."

MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA,

18372(1969).
See generally Nygaard, supra note 10.

DON QUIXOTE OF LA MANCHA
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enforce it, and I am highly skeptical of any who claim such a dispensation. Unfortunately, that offenses against the public peace may also violate what some interpret to be God's law seems to animate significant
numbers among us to lay a claim to righteousness by condemning as sinners those whose acts also happen to be crimes. But in this view lies a
penal dilemma based upon a personal conundrum: We seem unable to
separate our distaste for another's sin from the Scriptural admonitions to

eschew vengeance, 73 to love,74 and to forgive our neighbor,

irrespective

of whether he is, or may be, a sinner by canonical definitions. It is just

so much less complicated to simply hate both sin and sinner. 76 This easy
way out, unfortunately, is reflected in how we have historically treated
our offenders.
All that having been said, I hasten to add that the lessons and pre-

cepts of most norms of morality are imbedded in religious principles and,
as a consequence, religious principles have sponsored many of our criminal laws.7 And so, religion as a powerful medium of instruction, is also
73 The Prophet of Islam asks, "Do you wish to know the ultimate and most refined
in
ethics for both life and the afterlife? It is to maintain kinship ties even with those who
have shunned you, to give to those who have deprived you, and to forgive those who
have wronged you." Muhammad EI-Ghazali, Strivingfor a Higher Ethic, in YES TO A
GLOBAL ETHIC 181 (1996).
74 "Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of
thy people,

but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Leviticus 19:18.
75 The central theme of the most often-recited prayer in Christendom,

and that which
the Lord taught his disciples to pray, is that God will forgive us as we forgive others. In
the Lord's Prayer forgiveness is reciprocal; if we forgive, we will be forgiven. For example: "If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him, and if he repent, forgive him."
Luke 17:3. "[Fiorgive, and ye shall be forgiven." Luke 6:37. "But if ye do not forgive,
neither will your Father which is in heaven forgive your trespasses." Mark 11:26. See
also Matthew 18:21-34, which gives the illustration of the man who, seeking more time
from his creditors, is unwilling to forgive his debtors and is sent to be tortured, with the
admonition: "So shall my heavenly Father do to you if you refuse to truly forgive your
brothers."
76 1 am not sure what sin is, but it seems to be as others
describe it, always
something someone else is doing. The theologian can study the intrinsic
morality or justice of an act. A penologist, however, must study justice in
the context of its social implications. Thus the study of penology, separated from its theological implications avoids the moral ground, so debatable and which seems to cause its debaters to become so inflamed. We
must detach ourselves from the theological notion of sin, and evaluate both
the offending acts and the penological response to them according to the
needs of the individual offender, in conjunction with the underlying need
for order in our culture. On this common theoretical and pragmatic
ground, arguments about higher principles are more easily reconciled.
Ny#aard, supra note 8, at 250.
See LAwRENcE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 31

(1993), for an overview of the conception of Americans' crime response among the colonial puritans.
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a fundamental basis for reform. Lord Acton says that "[t] he first of human concerns is religion, and it is the salient feature of the modem centuries."'
From even a casual study of the religion of politics,7 9 one can see
that religion is a constantly recurring source of themes in how we pose
questions about, and solutions to the central problems of the human experience.8s Religion seems to be in the core content, and among the
sources of morality and hence our understanding of mythology and psychology, at least in the Abrahamic faiths. For the Christian, it is experiential metaphysics. As illustrated by such works as the "post-Easter"
Biblical writings,81 Dante's guide to paradise, or C.S. Lewis's books
among others, the difficult questions of philosophy are supplanted by the
easy, but often unverifiable claim to revelation. For the Jew, religionthe Torah, is concerned with the whole of human life. It is the covenant
between God and Israel and stands at the center of one's individual actions of the life of the community and of the relations of the community
with its neighbors. We find the same covenantal aims expressed in the
Word of the Qur'an called the Revelation of Allah, and given to the
Religion, whatever it is in individual lives, reprophet Muhammad.
flects that constant, often inner, sometimes corporate struggle to reconcile the reality of the evil we can see with our desire to trust in a God we
78 JOHN EMERICH EDWARD, FIRST BARON ACTON, LEcruRS ON MODERN HISTORY 8

(MacMillan & Co. trans. 1918) (1906).
79 Used in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense--I-Iotitq-politics, is the science
of
the city-state, the polis, and its members, not confined to our narrow, common, and almost pejorative sense. rloktny involves not only the science of the state, it includes our
concept of 'society" and "culture" as well. See generally PLATO, supra note 47
(specifically The Apology and The Politics sections).
so This is true no matter whether you agree with Freud that religion is the product
of
a psychological weakness, see SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 21-32, 4158 (James Strachey trans., Norton Books 1961) (1928); or Marx that religion is an
"opium," see KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 244 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton
trans., Vintage Books 1975); or agree with Durkheim that religion is the product of social
deficiency or need, EMILE DuRKHiM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 42-54
(J. Swain trans., Macmillan 1961); or a mere ethical ideal, see generally John Dewey,
Faith and its Object, in A COMMON FAITH (1934); or that it is mystical experientialism,
see GERSHOM SCHOLEM, MAJOR TRENDS IN JEWISH MYSncIsM 5-31 (1954). Because the
result is the same-religion is a significant social actuator. See generally JACOB
NEEDLEMAN ET AL., REIGION PORA NEW GENERATION (1977).
81 Looking at Biblical books and letters about Jesus as "pre-Easter" and "postEaster" comes from MARCUS J. BORG, MEETING JESUS AGAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME: THE
HISTORICAL JESUS & THE HEART OF CONTEMPORARY FAITH (1994).
82 . [Elven if the religion of the Jew is different from the religion of the Muslim,
the
Christian or the Buddhist, what they have in common is the possibility and the need to
declare themselves united in one and the same ethic... " Elie Wiesel, Towards an Ethic
Which Honours Humankind and the Creator, in YES TO A GLOBAL ETHIC 107 (1996).
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cannot.8 3 Even as noteworthy a religious cynic as George Bernard Shaw4
concluded that "religion is the only real motive force in the world."
Unfortunately, in religious practice, blind faith is often acceptable because it has a historical legacy to which significant numbers subscribe.
Religion-as distinguished from church, denominations, and the myriad
peculiarities we have served up as surrogates for religion-far from receiving the treatment of benign ignorance it has been given-deserves
some recognition as a correctional force in penology and community. 5
For these reasons, among others, religious codes of conduct have
dominated and will continue to dominate in the field of moral instructions .86 Some see a causal connection between declines in church or
93 Aelred Graham says that:
[Elvery religion may be regarded as the basic symbol system of its respective adherents. Conversely, a person's basic symbol system is for all
practical purposes his or her religion. Thus a multiplicity of religious
choices present themselves. Besides a fragmented Christianity (for which
'ecumenism' is another name) Judaism in its various forms, Hinduism,
Buddhism, Sufiism and other accepted claimants, we have agnosticism,
secular humanism, nature worship, Marxism and psychoanalysis, to name
but a few of the refuges in which people seek a solution to life's problems-or salvation -to use the old-fashioned language of religion.
NEEDLEMAN ET AL., supra note 80, at 12.
84 See SMITh, supra note 65, at 15. Bertrand Russell viewed this
force, as it emanates from Christianity, as largely social, having much to do with the influence of the
church upon us, and not so much to do with the actual teachings of Jesus. See Russm.L,
supra note 71, at 24-25.
5 "Religion," as I use it, does not share an exact definitional identity
with the notion
of "church," whose history is rich with acts of charity, but is also checkered with intolerance, bigotry, persecution, and violence. Nor does religion share an identity with theology, which is often not really a "study of God," but a church's or denomination's attempt
to explain itself or rationalize its tenets. The philosophical, spiritual, or intellectual depth
of any concept is easily tested by the degree to which one feels defensive about it when
challenged. Few challenges inspire a more spirited defense than a challenge to the tenets
of one's church or denomination. "Church" is that which happens "when [religious]
groups get strong enough to 'organize' themselves [and] become ecclesiastical institutions
with corporate ambitions of their own." JAMES, supra note 52, at 334-35. After which
"[tihe spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are... apt to enter and contaminate
the originally innocent thing." Id. Americans have taken great pains to erect a "wall of
separation" between this institution of "church" and the state. Our piety, or some may
say spirituality, is the sum of our fervently-held moral or ethical beliefs, whether born of
myth, philosophy, or religion, and that, I posit, is different. This piety and these beliefs

are inseparable from ourselves, are reflected in our individual visions of morality, and
hence, pass spirit-like through the "wall" as they follow each of us who participates in
government, whether as voter, juror, or public official. See generally STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CuLTuRE OF DisBmEIE (1993) for another excursus on this subject.
86 The historian Arnold Toynbee says "the greatest benefactors of
the living generation of mankind [are] Confucius and Laotze, the Buddha, the Prophets of Israel and Judah, Zoroaster, Jesus, Mohammed and Socrates." CIVLZATION ON TRIAL 156 (1948).
The American philosopher Jacob Needleman says that the two persons who had the
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synagogue attendance and other forms of corporate worship and a rising
social and legal immorality and, hence, criminality and the converse.
Perhaps others view these phenomena merely as trends that nonetheless
graphically demonstrate that non-penal institutions play a vital role in
reinforcing our common ethos and teaching "right conduct"; that peer
approval is significant; and that acceptance, whether by our culture, the
cultural sub-units, or the counter-culture, is crucial to the individual ego
and becomes a prime factor in behavioral conformity. However we
choose to explain the phenomenon, religious experience unquestionably is
part of both the American ethical experience and its penological theory.
Alexis de Tocqueville described our much-younger country as a
place where "education and liberty are the daughters of morality and religion. " 88 If the criminal justice delivery system's product is to recreate
moral and safe citizens capable of participating in, and contributing to
our culture, we must do what is necessary to foster the development and
growth of de Tocqueville's progenitors of education and liberty. The
"wall of separation" must protect social and civil governance from the
fanaticism or bigotry of denominations and their true believers. But, it
must not be used to deny the primary well of morality to the ethically de-

hydrated.8 9
One of the most persistent themes running throughout nature, religion, and mythology is the "death and rebirth" experience. 90 In mythol-

greatest impact on western civilization were Plato and Jesus. See JACOB NEEDLEMAN,
THE HEART OF PHILOSOPHY 27 (1982). The contemporary Christian theologian Marcus J.
Borg states that Socrates and Jesus were the two most influential persons. See BORG, supra note 81, at 89. Religion, whether one calls it faith, belief, philosophy, or mythology,
has been, is, and will continue to be a significant, perhaps the most significant, social
force in America.
87 See

JAMES

Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE:

THE DEFINITvE STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF CREME 430-38 (1985).
98 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 58, at 203.

99 Albert Camus writes of a Nazi collaborator, who
after confessing to numerous,
despicable war crimes, and after declaring himself to be beyond redemption, was put to
death. "My hands are red with blood," he allegedly said to a fellow prisoner. And he
was adjudged both by the courts and the public to be irredeemable. Camus says he, too,
would have agreed had he not "read one astonishing piece of evidence: after having declared that he wanted to die bravely, the Nazi collaborator told the same prisoner: 'Do
you know what I regret most of all? Not having known sooner about the Bible they gave
me here. If I had, I wouldn't be where I am now.'" BLOM-COOPER, supra note 55, at
40. A real understanding of why people behave as they do, may indeed upset beliefs
about both the success of an increasingly godless culture and the fallacy of hating both
'sin and sinner," and, moreover, may well point with alarm to the devaluation of traditional sources of inculcation-of which religion is one- and towards the real determiners
of human behavior. See Nygaard, supra note 10, at 837 n.30.
90 See generally THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFNCH'S MYTHOLOGY (1855) (including Legends of Charlemagne (1863); Age of Chivalry (1858); Age of Fable (1855)); JOSEPH
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ogy, Odysseus, Orpheus, Osiris, Adonis, Attis, and in the Bible, Jonah
and Jesus, among others, all "died" and were "reborn." 9 1 Tribal puberty rites, initiation ceremonies, ordinations, and even marriages are
symbolic deaths to a past and resurrections to a future. And in Christian
Scriptures Jesus's response to Nicodemus has created a rallying cry and a
litmus-like test for many evangelical Christians.9 Indeed, the story of
Jesus's death and resurrection is one of the most widely told in the western world and represents one of the most significant events in western
philosophical development. 93 As Keen says: "There is no ascension into
heaven without a descent into hell, no resurrection without crucifixion,
no success without failure, etc. This rhythm or oscillation has been central to the Western notion of growth. "94
Forgiveness has a role in this experience and effects penology as
well. For the offender who is sincerely repentant; feels shame for his
act; who has recaptured compassion for the feelings of others; realizes
the pain he has caused; and, who truly desires to turn a new leaf and be
reconciled with society; the system must determine how it can facilitate
that desire, not frustrate it out of ignorance or misguided notions, which
some people think compel us to just punish and release. 9 Symbolically,
to be reborn, one first must expect to die. And, for the myth to be effec96
tive-to metaphorically die-one must also expect to be reborn.
Ananda Coomaraswamy wrote, "No
creature can attain a higher grade of
97
exist."
to
ceasing
without
nature
Look with me for a moment at what is currently perhaps the most
well-known and concrete example of the death/rebirth experience with
CAMPBELL, ORIENTAL MYTHOLOoY: THE MASKS OF GOD (1962); EDITH HAMILTON,
MYTHOLOGY: TIMELES TALES OF GODS AND HEROES (1940).
91 Toynbee calls this phenomenon "withdraw and return." For example,
the Buddha
withdrew for 6 years and spent the next 45 years with his public. See SMITH, supra note
65, at 129. Joseph Campbell said, "Every process involves breaking something up. The

earth must be broken to bring forth life. If the seed does not die, there is no plant. Bread

results from the death of wheat." JOSEPH CAMPBELL, A JOSEPH CAMPBELL COMPANION:
RELC=ONS OF THE ART OF LIvINO 19 (Diane K. Osborn ed., Harper Perennial 1991).
92 "Except a man be born again (born of water and the spirit) he cannot see
the kingdom of God." John 3:3-5.
93 See NEEDLEMAN, supra note
86, at 27.
94 KEEN, supra note 36, at 100.
95 John Calvin is often quoted as saying, "No one ever truly repents until he
or she
has experienced the possibility of forgiveness." DAvID AUoSBmRGER, CARING ENOUGH
TO FoRGIvE 68 (1981).
96 The Gita says "For all things born in truth shall die, and out of
death in truth
comes life." THE BHAGAVAD GITA 50 (Juan Mascaro trans., Penguin Books 1962).
Christian dogma teaches he who "shall lose his life shall preserve it." Luke 17:33.
97 ANANDA COOMARASWAMY, AKIMCANNA: SELF-NAUGHTING
6 n.14 (1940); see
also JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 92 (Princeton Univ. Press
1968).
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penological application-the military basic training or "boot camp."
Boot camp is not, as is thought by some to be, merely a "grunt and
sweat" experience. Psychologically, it is a complex ritual, welldeveloped and richly laden with tradition and legend by which an immature and uncertain teenager is transformed into a confident soldier or
sailor. Stripped of dignity, shorn of hair, shed of clothing, perhaps even
denied one's given name and bereft of many rights and most privileges
held dear, one dies to both a childhood and a civilian past.
This symbolic death is fully fifty percent of the equation. It is not,
however, the end-it is but the beginning. 9 s For the primary goal of the
experience is not the death of a civilian, but the rebirth of a soldier. One
is slowly and surely reborn into a new image. One earns one's rights
back, one by precious one, with the goal that one will never voluntarily
relinquish them and, indeed, will fight and die to protect them. The new
person created will probably never be the same again, for he and she,
through the process of the boot camp, has begun the transformation into a
U.S. warrior. Moreover, graduating from boot camp is but the beginning in a series of promotional steps that last for the approximate length
of one's tenure with the military. It prepares one for a series of improvements and promotions, and the military community provides the
structure and the means for continued opportunity, promotion, and reward. 99
But one cannot really die to a past of which one is consistently reminded. A civilian youth is given a new psychology, different clothes,
different standards of conduct, a hierarchical system of respect for, and
submission to, authority, a new vocabulary, new skills-he or she becomes a soldier. "Civilianness" is driven from the "boots" until ideally,
they want or believe they want, a life that differs from their past.1 0 The
98 A mistake the penal boot camp programs and others like "Scared Straight" make is
to consider the program an end in itself-an alternate opportunity to punish or "get
tough." This shortcoming takes from the programs their greatest value-the rebuilding
that is supposed to follow. The toughness of boot camp is to soften one's resolve and
place one in the proper position for a change of heart. Pure punishment without more

turns hearts to stone.

99 For the death/rebirth myth to be fully functional, the opportunities must be
both
known and stable. For to induce one to relinquish a grip on the present for the sake of
the future- to die and be reborn- one must hold out inducements. In one of the Sutras,
the Buddha is asked how to help a person face death. He replies that one must place
something desirable out "beyond the flames," to help one to pass through them. See
BLOM-COOPER, supra note 55, at 105. For the Christian, the belief in an eternal life in
paradise provides the same measure of assurance: "[Djeath is swallowed up in victo 7 . ... 0 death where is thy sting? 0 grave where is thy victory?" I Cor. 15:54-55.
0o As Michel Foucault describes, the training is to get "rid of the peasant, [and give]
him the air of the soldier." FOUCAULT, supra note 55, at 135 (quoting ordinance (Mar.
20, 1764)).
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evolving story of each person's life is embedded in the "community"
from which that person currently derives her or his identity. The goal of
the boot camp experience is to create a new self-identity and a desire to
assume both the new image and the new community that will now expect
allegiance from its new members. So it is with the myth, a significant
element of which is to renounce the past, whether through psychology,
forgiveness, atonement, or redemption (or some combination), that one
can, indeed must, begin anew.
In every change of direction there comes a moment of indecision
when one stands between options or directions, is attached to neither, and
weighs the relative merits of each. In penology, is anything about human
nature different? It is not. Repentance and correction are the real, albeit
unacknowledged, often unexpressed hopes of sentencing. Of course, it is
natural to despise one who has abused us or another with whom we identify. Indeed, a philosophical reason given for sentences is that they legitimate or rationalize the passions that we feel upon being victimized
and, to a lesser extent, what we feel upon seeing another with whom we
identify suffer an indignity or become prey at the hands of an offender.
Hence, we must recognize that it is the victim only who has standing in
the personal sense to forgive an offender.
Nonetheless, without condemning the victim for hating the predator,
nor fully rejecting the legitimization a sentence gives the hatred, socially
we are challenged not to join in the hatred, but to facilitate behavioral
change and the healing-not just to punish, but to repair. It is the sovereign only who has the power to punish infractions of criminal rules.
Because the victim loses control and power over the means and method
of punishment when he or she accuses another of a crime, institutionally
the criminal justice delivery system can if it wishes take the higher principled ground and set an example for its citizens. And, without taking
from the victim the personal standing to forgive, nonetheless provide a
systemic forgiveness for cases in which, just as punishment is now
viewed, forgiveness serves a positive purpose for the criminal justice delivery system and the culture it is ostensibly designed to protect. I suggest that it do so. When an offender stands at that moment of indecision,
we must do what is necessary to induce a change that is culturally positive; a move towards our society.
Few of us wish to lead, nor is it likely that we can lead, isolated
lives. We seek society, usually with our own-stated more accurately,
perhaps, with people who match the image we have of ourselves. We
socialize with others who provide us psychological or actual help when
our personal resources wane. Offenders are no different. They too seek
acceptance from someone. When an offender has, or believes he has, no
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possibility of being accepted in our civil culture, he is sure to seek communion elsewhere. A society that repulses a truly repentant person for
his past bad acts may well also thrust him into an anti-society that will
accept him. Criminals now are "non-persons" by the standards of polite
society and ill prepared by prison to cope therein.
When we commit an offender to prison, he enters an entirely different moral universe than ours. Rarely can one successfully just resume
his life after prison, which is ethically a mutual contamination and culturally an amoral cross-pollination. The emotional wounds seldom heal.
And if they do heal, offenders are still left scarred and some disfigured.
Forever stigmatized by their conviction, they usually become the "hardcore" unemployed, unable to participate in government, hold public office or, indeed, often unable to vote. All this after they are psychologically, and sometimes physically, damaged by their prison experience.
There is little wonder that, haunted by the social vacuum left in the wake
of their prison experience and shunned by mainstream culture, they often
join or create one of their own. The process of arrest, trial, conviction,
and sentence is a "death"-of that there is no doubt. Moreover, offenders are "reborn"-of that there is also no doubt. Unfortunately, as it
now stands, their rebirth is all too often not into our culture, but often
into the dark crimini-culture where they become factors in the myth of
the criminal class.
Outlaw bands were formed and gangs, criminal cultures, and crime
families are created to meet an impulse to preserve a psychological need
for support and to answer one's urge to be accepted. We each want to be
wanted. We each want to be accepted. Few of us would thrive if we felt
totally rejected.1 °1 Yet that is precisely what we do; we treat the criminal
offender by rejection, and the pariah created seeks aid and comfort from
others like him. One may choose to follow the career path of a burglar,
a thief, a scam artist, or engage in a host of other deviant endeavors, all
are antisocial acts and actors who prey upon civil society. Yet, if one is
"good" within the limits of this chosen line of "work," one finds acceptance in the criminal antisociety and thereby achieves a social gratification by approval from the "peers" we have urged upon him, irrespective
of whether his acts were morally and culturally good.

101 Quasimodo, deformed, ugly, and despised, found nothing but hatred about him,
and he too grew to hate. As Victor Hugo writes of the hunchback, "He had picked up
the weapon with which he had been wounded." VicToR Huco, THE HUNCHBACK OF
NOTRE DAME 180-S1 (trans. n.d.). We too must expect that one who feels despised and
rejected will develop defense mechanisms with which to cope. Some of these mechanisms, we must also expect, will be personally and socially destructive.
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Just as a society is a union of persons drawn together by common
attitudes, and/or for the purpose of doing things in common, criminal
classes are similarly bound together by the pariah status they hold in
common and the "shared secret" of their experience.1°2 Hence, it should
not be surprising that the offender too turns his back, both actually and
psychologically, upon the culture that spurns him and that refuses to forgive his past-a past he may well have died to or at least have tried unThey gravitate towards each other as a
successfully to leave behind.
result of their common social deficiencies and have founded an antisociety-a counter, crimini-culture. The cohesive force of this criminiculture, and the distinctiveness of its self-consciousness, as with all class
identities, is in proportion to the degree to which it perceives itself ostracized by, and in conflict, with our culture. And, prison is not aiding
us in breaking these counter-cultural bonds.
The American prison is in reality a Potemkin village; functioning as

a human container, but hiding the emotional and psychological decay it
wreaks on its inhabitants behind a facade that society is all too anxious to
accept as reality. 1°4 We lose entirely with our so-called "correction"
system when, instead of correcting inmates and reenculturating citizens,
it subjugates, isolates, and permits them to recreate an anti-society that
feeds their pathological, emotional, and social needs completely irrespective of the social expectations of American culture. And even more
troubling, after fostering the establishment of this anti-society, we will
most certainly see its unwelcomed metastasis in the neighborhoods and
communities into which offenders are released.
There are situations wherein forgiveness might serve penology well
if we will permit some offenders to shed the baggage of past mistakes and
be readmitted to the status of full membership in our society. Can we
102 The phenomenon of bonding by the "shared secret" is found in aspects of life too
numerous to mention. It is the reason for the fraternities' and sororities' secret word and
special handshake. It is the reason for the special relationship that develops between

friends who share their innermost thoughts. It is what makes the marriage strong, and the
divorce bitter.
103 "Liberation is not deliverance; a man may leave [prison], but not the condemnation." 1 HUoo, supra note 64, at 77. We know too little of the damage prison does to the

individual's psyche. We should know more. From the correspondence I have received
from prisoners, I believe, however, that we do far too little to undo the damage done by
prison to the offenders who are released therefrom. Sometimes, we do nothing: no deprogramming; no "boot camp" for teaching life-skills;, no readjustment counseling; often, no job and no job prospects, and we thereby destroy much of the potential we could
derive from them when they rejoin society.
104 Perhaps 'overanxious" is more accurate. I suspect that most Americans really
know the evil that abides in the American prison; a "conscious ignorance." That is to
say, one must know something of the location of a place or a person one wants to be sure
to ignore. The prisons we ignore are not out of ignorance.
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really expect one to transcend one's past when we consistently remind
him of it? The offender's criminal record, documented and computerized
will follow him everywhere and forever. It is well-lodged in the institutional memory: But, it need not always haunt him. We must work towards a correction system that truly tries to put an offender symbolically
to death; to be reborn as a citizen in the image of our culture. I am certain we can be successful in correcting sufficient numbers of offenders
and, if we can, that we can then begin systemically and penologically
to
5
"forgive" some of them and to foster a fresh, guilt-free start. 10
Punishment, however, if it remains as the core concept in our penology, forecloses serious consideration of forgiveness in sentencing.
Pain is in great dissonance with humanitarian values, including kindness
and forgiveness. 0 6 It is also in great tension with practical values, such
as correction and economy. 107 The pragmatic realities of sentencing may
command the threat of punishment, for I am sure that Damocles never
danced better than he did beneath the sword. Moreover, until detected,
the offender obviously was unwilling to behave. Hence, it is the offender
who must first want to correct his behavior.108 But, the realities demand
more than we now do. We must devise a system that encourages offenders who wish to correct and alter their behavior and facilitate the process
any way we can.

105 In C.S. Lewis's book, THE SCREWTAPE LErERS (1962), a diligent demon is assigned the task of causing a righteous man to err. The favored weapon in the devil's arsenal is guilt, and his favored tactic in creating it is to cause the man to dwell on his in-

adequacies. Not all guilt is bad. But, we must also remember that not all guilt, especially
unending guilt, is productive and conducive to the true reconciliation with society we
should desire of all reformed cultural deviants.
106 See NILS CHRISTE, LIMITS TO PAIN 5 (1981).

107 Pain, as a penological device, is also in dissonance with some philosophies we purport to follow. Aristotle contended that an actor must identify with the collective goals,
aims and motivations; and that "as soon as a man becomes corrupted by pleasure or pain,

the goal no longer appears to him as the motivating principle: he no longer sees that he
should choose and act in every case for the sake of and because of this end." ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHIcS 153 (Martin Oswald trans., Prentice Hall 1962). I would sum-

marize Immanuel Kant's theory of penology and criminal justice as a system designed to
mandate one's attention to his duty to obey.
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE
ME'APHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965). Kant
had no trouble with causing offenders pain. Nonetheless, corrective measures must produce a renewed attention to duty. He said if actions are to be considered as morally

good, they must be done from a call to do one's duty, and not out of concern for avoiding
what he calls "inconvenient results" that may ensue. See KANT, supra note 4, at 70.

109 The story is told of how in the French Parliament passionate proponents of a bill to
abolish capital punishment were sobered by a voice from the rear of the chamber who
said, "Que messieurs les assassins commencement!" SIGMUND FREUD, CIzATON
AND ITS DIScoNTEwTs 58 (James Strachey trans., W.W. Norton 1962).
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When confronted with a personal offense committed against them;
the simple get mad, the average get even, but the wise get ahead. Even
simple acts become great when done with great motive. But, great acts
are demeaned when done out of spite. Personally, we all look irredeemably small when we act vindictively, yet we do it so purposely and
deliberately when we collectively act vindictive in penology. We will
discover that we are really bigger than average personally and greater
than average culturally; that we are wiser and more pragmatic than our
politicians think we are; that by doing great acts we can become even
bigger and greater; and that we can come out ahead.
De Tocqueville said that harshness is an acknowledgment of the
sovereign's weakness; leniency is a sign of its strength. 1°9 How would
de Tocqueville view the current political popularity of the "get tough and
if that does not work get tougher," policy espoused by our politicians?
The answer is evident. This pattern of reaction exposes a fundamental
legislative weakness: Law must be more than a farrago of rules enforced
by penalty. There is a fundamental psychological difference between a
social reaction that is vengefully tough and an action that is purposefully
tough. Law need be described as neither soft nor tough; it must be more.
Law must be an educational force as well. America must make a greater
social investment in character development; and place a diminished emphasis upon and investment in, the medium of punishment.1 10 It is time
that law set a higher example. It is time to get "smart" on crime.
Authorities who cannot easily be ignored forcefully argue that the
ultimate aim of the criminal justice delivery system is "justice," which
means due process of law to some, and to others, that everyone must get
about what is coming to them-their "just desserts."' 1 I submit that
this base concept must not be the ultimate goal of the criminal justice delivery system. Justice should be the threshold: Once we have achieved
it, we must cross over and seek higher goals of redeeming, repairing, and
rebuilding; for society, for the victim, and for the offender. 112 Going
109 See DE TocQuEv..,

supra note 58, at 327.
110 The concept of the criminal justice delivery system as a medium for "social investment" is from DANIEL W. VAN Nass, CRIME AND ITs VicTiMs 145 (1986).
M Plato said of justice, that "the origin and nature of justice-it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the
worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and
honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice." See PLATO, supra note 47, at
31lb.
112 Creon's rigid jurisprudence creates havoc in Thebes. Sophocles states, "Creon
shows the world that of all ills afflicting men the worst is lack of judgment." SoPHocL ,
ANTIGONE 123-24 (Robert Fagles tramns., Penguin Books 1982).
He scorns Creon's
judgment with the admonition "Too late, too late you see what justice means." Id.
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beyond justice, forgiveness in the appropriate circumstance is a win/win
situation. It is, however, now totally alien to the "if I am to win/you
must lose" attitude that pervades the adversary relationship between the
parties to the criminal justice system and, which in the process, pretermits consideration of compassion regardless of how productive it might
be in a given situation.
Consider this rather simple example: Assume that an individual, out
of spite, mischief or anger, hurls a rock through your window.1 3 Suspecting, or perhaps intuitively knowing who did it, you confront him.
He has a choice to confess or deny his guilt. Assume that he admits his
guilt. There may be many motivations why one may admit guilt, but assume that this offender is truly contrite and feels genuine compassion for
you, the victim. Moreover, he makes full restitution to you and he
apologizes. You now have a choice; you can accept the apology and
forgive him, or you can reject the apology, refuse to forgive and demand
of the system that it impose its full measure of retribution. It is likely
that some measure of punishment is indicated to reinforce our behavioral
ideals and to remind the offender that his misbehavior is not without its
consequences. But thereafter, which choice do you think will best repair
your relationship with the offender and effect a personal reconciliation?
Which choice will best repair the offender socially and effect a cultural
reconciliation?
Forgiveness is completely at odds with a desire to exact retribution
on offenders because forgiveness is the other side of revenge. It is the
face we never see if all we want to do is punish those who err. For
people who are conditioned to want revenge instead of the more difficult
effort to understand, forgiveness is the absence of justice; and in taking
revenge, even though they thereby perpetuate crime, believe they are advancing justice. This is because both forgiveness and revenge are attempts to deal with the same human need for balance, wholeness, and
healing. Where revenge alienates, however, forgiveness heals. The
criminal justice delivery system should set an example for society, assist
to condition citizens to desire progress, guide them to seek positive
healing results, and not remain mired in hatred or their dark desire for

113 The illustration is simple and may seem to describe an offense that is
easy to forgive. It is. It is to be remembered, however, that depending upon the value of the property destroyed, and the jurisdiction, a willful destruction of property may result in criminal charges ranging from a summary offense to a felony. A significant percentage of
offenses in any jurisdiction are not the murders, rapes, or other violent and newsworthy
offenses; they are the seemingly minor offenses that result, nonetheless, in criminal
charges, convictions, sentences, and hence, indelible criminal records.
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revenge.1 1 4 It is with individuals, such as the one in my hypothetical,
that culture can benefit the most and lose the least from an institutional or
official forgiveness. Forgiveness can fit, with some modifications, into
our criminal justice delivery system.
One of the orthodox philosophical justifications for punishing offenders is to reinforce the resolve of the law-abiding to remain obedient
by providing a public, cultural denunciation of the disobedient. The ordinary person does need a "philosophy," although one may not call it
that, or a reason to "lash one's self to the mast" to aid in resisting the
siren's song of temptation11 5 and instead to follow the harsh-the
"straight and narrow" road-of morality. Hence, even if justice fails the
offender and the punishment is excessive, even destructive to the offender, the generalized impact upon the culture is positive because it reinforces a useful general vision or philosophy of morality. The same logic
and psychology applies to the notion of forgiveness by viewing it as the
obverse side of punishment. For one of three things will happen to the
released offender: He will become a positive, contributing citizen; he will
fade away and do nothing good or bad; or he will commit other crimes.
Anything we do to encourage the first; improve the second; and diminish
the third is positive. Even, however, if justice fails society and the offender is not rehabilitated and returns to the system, still we will have
Kant says: An action done from duty has its
done the right thing.
the
results it attains or seeks to attain, but from a
not
from
moral worth,
formal principle or maxim-the principle of doing one's duty whatever
that duty may be.1 7 We have a duty to each other to require that the
criminal justice delivery system ask fresh questions, go beyond the orthodox, and do more that just punish those who violate our laws.
An offender's sentence need not just punish, nor should citizens be
satisfied with mere punishment. The sentence can do more and we must
demand that it do more. It can, in some instances, facilitate the cultural
114

"Haired is not health. It is a poison. It will cripple and even kill the individual or

the society that feeds on it .... The human thirst for vengeance, the human instincts of
hate and fear, need no encouragement from the law .... [Wle need not reinforce them
and give them dignity by legal endorsement." HENRY WMHOFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH
140, 143 (1979).
115 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 272-77 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1996).
11 Even for the "backslider" the overall effect of the attempt, which requires the offender to commit to change, may be quite socially positive. For one who makes a
commitment to change usually establishes a psychological fusion to, and identification
with one's new role. Hence, even if enthusiasm wanes, the psychological tug is to succeed. And, although the role change may only divert one in small degrees, far fewer than
the desired 180 degrees, failure will often not result in total reversion to the former self.
See JAMES, supra note 52, at 258.
117 KANT, supra note 4, at 68.
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healing process as well. What William James calls the "whole phenomenon of regeneration" is the sum of "subconscious incubations and maturing of motives deposited by the experiences of life." 118 We have little to
lose by using the opportunity of a criminal sentence to expose the offender to experiences of life from which we can help to regenerate or
create solid citizens out of our cultural offenders. It is time for government to follow Goethe's admonition, show the strength of which de Tocqueville wrote, and exercise its leadership to help us reach toward our
civilization's potential for greatness.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is an American civilization. It is made up of all of us, diverse almost beyond measure. Yet, despite our variety, we must learn
how to assure everyone that each of us can share in its visions. If we do
not and instead, alienate all offenders, we cannot expect that they who do
not see a role for themselves in the civilization will willingly join us in
the building and rebuilding effort so necessary to sustain it. Americans
have an uneasiness about their penology and with good reason. It represents a prime example of the parallax view we have of each other and of
the distance between our ideals and our deeds-between what we are and
what we know we should be. We have an ideal and a vision. But, underneath it all, we are not living up to either. The distinction between
"them" and "us" is not that significant and the myths of punishment by
which we support our condemnation and nonremedial treatment of offenders are not assuring civil security.
There is a story told of an offender brought before King James II.
The King taunted the prisoner with the rhetorical inquiry, "You know it
is within my power to pardon you." To which the prisoner replied,
"Yes, I know it is in your power to pardon me, but not in your nature." 119 What is our nature? What is your nature? For offenses that
are in the class of simple cultural indignities, let us bear them practically,
sentence offenders pragmatically, and, out of a sense of our own dignity
and strength, turn our attention to correcting those for whom some effort
may produce positive results. For the offenders who are rehabilitated,
we should explore the possibility of an institutional form of forgiveness
in the limited circumstances proposed. We as a culture should begin by
asking ourselves Smedes's first question: Do we want to be healed or do
we want to go on suffering from an offense committed against us by
leaving it lodged unforgiven in our institutional memory?
11s JAMEs, supra note 52, at 230.
119

KLmN, supra note 22, at 28.
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Offenders respond emotionally to their situations and frustrations.
When we allow, indeed encourage, the criminal justice delivery system to
respond emotionally to ours, we drop with the social dregs to their cultural level: We do not elevate them to ours. Let us not lose our civilization in the very act by which we seek to vindicate it. Let us not become like Captain Ahab who destroys himself in the act of seeking his
revenge.12 0 Or, like Inspector Javert, who for forty years doggedly pursues Jean Valjean, accused only of a minor crime; and then when Javert
is compelled by circumstances to recognize the existence of forgiveness,
he cannot. 121 Instead, in suicidal despair, Javert throws himself into the
Seine. Let us as a civilization not so much fear acts of kindness and
forgiveness that we wreak punishment upon our civilization in a selfdestructive reluctance to have our criminal justice delivery system do
anything but express our desire for revenge.
Forgiveness is not a moral antidote to the evils of crime. It is just
humanitarian incentive to those willing to make the effort to improve.
The future peace of society depends upon many strategies; this is but one
of them, and to be employed upon a limited number of offenders. There
are more people from whom our culture could benefit; if we can but
properly resurrect them. None of us is above error. None of us should
be beneath forgiveness. We must never be deluded into thinking we can
create a perfect society; but, we must never be so discouraged that we do
not try. Alexander Pope said it well:
and sense must ever join; to err is human, to forgive, diGood12nature
2

vine.

The human potential to err includes the possibility that some of our
errors may also be crimes and those with the good nature and divine
sense to forgive-even to forgive offenders- includes us. What do you
think?

120 See generally HERMAN MELvuz, MoBY DIcK (1952).
121 "One thing had astonished him, that Jean VaIjean had shown him mercy, and one
thing had petrified him, that he, Javert, had shown mercy to Jean Valjean."

2 Huoo,

a note 64, at 123.
Alexander Pope, An Fssay on Citicism, in COLLECTED POEMS 71 (Bonamy Dobree
ed., Everyman's Lib. 1983).
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